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EdinLR Vol 17 pp 370-376
Not Law (But Not Yet Effectively Not Law)
The United Kingdom Supreme Court (“UKSC”) had this to say about a provision of
an Act of the Scottish Parliament:1
The difference in treatment has no logical justification. It is unfair and disproportionate. It
is no answer to this criticism to say that there was an urgent need to meet the problem that
had been identified. The legislation was intended to have an effect which was permanent
and irrevocable.
This is hardly a ringing endorsement of the exercise of the Parliament’s devolved
powers. In March 2012 the Court of Session had held that section 72 of the
Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003 violated Salvesen’s rights under article 1of
the first protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (“A1P1”).2 Section
72 was, therefore, beyond the Parliament’s legislative competence3 and, as such, was
“not law”.4 The Court of Session’s interlocutor was not final,5 nor did it issue one
that was final and calibrated to provide a full remedial response to its finding, instead
granting leave to appeal to the UKSC on 29 March 2012,6 thus rendering further
procedure in the Court of Session inappropriate. The Second Division’s interlocutor,
as it stood, declared the entirety of section 72 to be in violation of the Convention,
and hence beyond the Parliament’s competence.
This contextual background is important, for while the UKSC allowed the appeal
it did so in a manner that left much of the substance of the Second Division’s
findings undisturbed – the UKSC only recalled the interlocutor in order to substitute
1 Salvesen v Riddell [2013] UKSC 22 at para 44 per Lord Hope of Craighead (with whom Lords Kerr,
Wilson, Reed and Toulson agreed).
2 Salvesen v Riddell [2012] CSIH 26, 2012 SLT 633 at para 107 per the Lord Justice Clerk (Gill) (hereafter
“Salveson (IH)”).
3 Scotland Act 1998 s 29(2)(d). See also D J Carr, “Not law” (2012) 16 EdinLR 410; MMCombe, “Human
rights, limited competence and limited partnerships: Salvesen v Riddell” 2012 SLT (News) 193.
4 Scotland Act 1998 s 29(1).
5 Salvesen (IH) at para 105.
6 Salvesen at para 30. Leave was required as the case concerns the competence of an Act of the Scottish
Parliament, which is a devolution issue: Scotland Act 1998 Sch 6 paras 1(a) and 13(b).
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the narrower finding that section 72(10) violated the Convention, and was therefore
beyond the Parliament’s competence.7 Confirmation that the impugned provision was
in violation of the Convention – and clearly so – is not surprising. However, the case
provides the first guidance about what the courts will do when faced with an ultra
vires Act of the Scottish Parliament.
A. MINISTERS AND PARLIAMENT
Ministerial conduct featured prominently in Lord Gill’s opinion in the Second
Division.8 In his opinion, it was appropriate to consider statements of ministers to
Parliament during the passage of the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Bill to assist in
identifying the justification behind section 72.9 Searching for such a justification was
a component of the well-known proportionality test in relation to A1P1.10
Interference with a property right must be in the public interest, but national
parliaments enjoy discretion in a question with national courts to determine
what is in the public interest by virtue of the national courts’ respect for their
democratically derived primacy11 (and not under the margin of appreciation, which
is a component of the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) supranational
jurisdiction12). This much has been clear since James v UK13 demonstrated that
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in this area is premised upon judicial deference
to the national authorities’ evaluation of political, economic and social issues.14
Domestic courts have, despite not being bound to do so,15 followed Strasbourg’s
lead and acknowledged the domestic decision maker’s wide discretion.16 The
scope and importance of that discretion is underscored by its applicability both
7 Salvesen at para 58.
8 Salvesen (IH) at paras 87-96.
9 At para 87.
10 On proportionality generally, see Lord Reed’s important recent (dissenting) opinion in Bank Mellat
v Her Majesty’s Treasury No 2 [2013] UKSC 39 at paras 68-76; more generally, see A Barak,
Proportionality (2012).
11 Axa General Insurance Company Ltd v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, 2012 SC (UKSC) 122 at para
32 per Lord Hope and para 131 per Lord Reed.
12 R v DPP ex parte Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326 at 380E-381D per Lord Hope; Brown v Stott 2001 SC (PC)
43 at 58I-59A per Lord Bingham.
13 James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 123.
14 Vistin¸š and Perepjolkins, App no 71243/01, 25 October 2012 at para 106.
15 Human Rights Act 1998 s 2(1)(a). See Regina (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] 2 AC 323, and
the recent interpretations in Rabone v Pennine Care NHS Trust [2012] 2 AC 72 at paras 110-114 per
Lord Brown; Hamilton v Ferguson Transport (Spean Bridge) Ltd 2012 SC 486 at para 49 per the Lord
President (Hamilton); Achmant v Greece [2012] EWHC 3470 (Admin) at paras 26-27 per Singh J;
Richards v Ghana [2013] EWHC 1254 (Admin) at paras 50-52 per Leggatt J. The “Ullah principle”,
as developed by the UKSC, is followed by the Scottish courts: “It may be that the ‘Ullah doctrine’ is
ripe for reconsideration or reformulation but, given its repeated application in the Supreme Court, it
is not for this court to attempt any such reconsideration or reformulation.” Ross v HM Advocate [2012]
HCJAC 45 at para 28 per the Lord Justice General (Hamilton).
16 Axa General Insurance Company Ltd v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, 2012 SC (UKSC) 122.
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to the instrument adopted and any assessment of the proportionality of that
instrument.17
Lord Gill’s analysis of possible justifications, which might be contained within
ministerial statements, concluded that section 72 was essentially “retaliatory” and
“punitive”.18 Lord Hope was more cautious: “. . . one must be careful not to treat a
ministerial or other statement as indicative of the objective intention of Parliament”.19
Moreover, the question of Convention compliance and the competence of section 72
was to be “judged primarily by what the section provides, not by what was said by
the deputy minister”.20 Lord Hope’s cautious approach must be technically correct,
though one might argue that the Lord Justice Clerk’s is more in tune with the realities
of modern legislating. Indeed, there is some uncertainty about when it is appropriate
to examine ministerial statements in order to ascertain the aims and objectives of
legislation. In Wilson v First County Trust Ltd21 Lord Hope noted that reference
might be made to ministerial statements when seeking to ascertain whether the aim
behind legislation was legitimate.22 As Lord Hobhouse noted:23
The questions of justification and proportionality involve a sociological assessment – an
assessment of what are the needs of society. This in part involves a legal examination of
the content and legal effect of the relevant provision. But it also involves consideration of
what is the mischief, social evil, danger etc. which it is designed to deal with. Often these
matters may already be within the knowledge of the court. But equally there will almost
always be other evidentially valuable material which can be placed before the court which
is relevant. . . To exclude such evidential material from the case merely because it is to be
found in some statement made in Parliament is clearly wrong, particularly if ministerial
statements made outside Parliament were already being relied on. This has nothing to
do with investigating or questioning the will of Parliament. Parliament has spoken by
passing the relevant Act. The evidence is admitted because it relates to making the required
sociological assessment.
Lord Hobhouse’s analysis is attractive in the sense that it recognises that the text
of an enacted statute will always represent Parliament’s will, but the objectives and
motivations underpinning the exercise of that will are theoretically distinct. One could
argue that Lord Gill’s approach is consistent with this analysis, and indeed with Lord
Hope’s earlier speech in Wilson. Likewise, in Axa,24 when examining whether the
Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009 had been pursuing a
legitimate aim, Lord Hope quoted liberally from ministerial statements, regulatory
17 Hermann v Germany, Application no. 9300/07, 26 June 2012 at para 74; Depalle v France (2012) 54
EHRR 17 at para 83; Chassagnou v France (2000) 29 EHRR 615 at para 75; Fredin v Sweden (1991)
13 EHRR 784 at para 51; Allgemeine Gold-und Silberscheideanstalt v UK (1987) 9 EHRR 1 at para 52.
18 Salvesen (IH) at para 90.
19 Salvesen at para 37, relying on Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) [2004] 1 AC 816 at para 66 per
Lord Nicholls.
20 Salvesen at para 39.
21 Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) [2004] 1 AC 816.
22 Wilson at para 118.
23 At para 142; Lord Rodger expressly adopted Lord Hobhouse’s analysis (para 178).
24 Axa General Insurance Company Ltd v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, 2012 SC (UKSC) 122.
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assessments and explanatory notes to the Bill.25 The fact that he acknowledged
that ministerial statements were not “irrelevant” and could provide “important
information” about the purpose of legislation arguably only obscures matters, coming
as it does after exhortations to distinguish the Scottish ministers from the Scottish
Parliament. Indeed, examination of the gestation and evolution of the discriminatory
provisions in a vacuum, bereft of ministerial statements, comes to a similar conclusion
but bears an air of artificiality. It may not be possible to adopt a rigid rule, and there
are grounds in both authority and common sense for the two approaches.
B. SECTION 72 AND A1P1
The UKSC took a somewhat narrower approach to the compatibility of section 72
than that taken by the Second Division. The language used in Lord Gill’s opinion
suggests that the whole of section 72 was incompatible with Convention rights and
the interlocutor of the court reflected this.26 Given the fact that the Second Division
had not yet heard submissions about the severability of components of legislation in
such a situation, indeed the court specifically invited them for a future hearing,27
this is unsurprising. The UKSC had the benefit of more specific submissions and
identified the key provision to be section 72(10).28 The significance of section 72(10)
is that it acts as a gatekeeper provision: it determines whether or not landlords will
be able to terminate a tenancy using section 73. The importance of section 73 is that
it allows landlords to bring tenancies to an end by notice29 without the necessary
involvement of the Land Court, which is an attractive counterpoise to the security of
tenure afforded to tenants in certain circumstances.30
The challenge to section 72(10) rested upon its gatekeeper effect in that it
prevented landlords31 who had given notice between 16 September 200232 and
30 June 200333 from availing themselves of the benefits of section 73 (landlords
giving notice after 30 June 2003 could use section 73). Section 72(10) is, therefore,
patently discriminatory and operates to penalise some landlords retrospectively.34
The appellant’s argument, that such discrimination constituted a proportionate and
justified legislative response to avoidance on the part of the Scottish Parliament
within its wide policy discretion under A1P1, was emphatically rejected,35 as it had
been in the Inner House.36 The key was the absence of a rational explanation for
25 At paras 29-30.
26 Salvesen (IH) at para 107.
27 At para 105.
28 Salvesen at para 41.
29 Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003 s 73(3).
30 Section 72(6).
31 Under a tenancy subsisting as a result of s 72(6).
32 In conjunction with Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003 s 72(3)(a).
33 Section 72(10)(b)(i), and Agricultural Holdings (Relevant Date and Relevant Period) (Scotland) Order
SSI 2003/294 at para 2.
34 Salvesen at para 42.
35 At para 44.
36 Salvesen (IH) at para 97.
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the difference in treatment between those giving notice before and after 30 June
2003. Both courts held that this (unjustified) differential treatment was so clearly set
out that section 72(10) could not be ameliorated by reading the impugned provision
according to the appropriate interpretative canons set out in the Scotland Act 1998
and Human Rights Act 1998.37 Section 72(10) could not be saved.
C. REMEDIAL ACTIONS
One of the most interesting elements of the decision is the question of remedies:
what practical actions would the court take when confronted by a piece of legislation
that was outwith the competence of the Scottish Parliament? Lord Hope situated his
discussion of the various statutory remedies within a broader context of principle:
although a problem had been found with the legislation, it remained a matter of
policy, and therefore a question for the Parliament, to consider how to respond
to the incompatibility.38 Finding section 72(10) to be incompatible with A1P1 was
exacerbated by its gatekeeper role: without it section 73 is a dead letter.39 Taking
the principle of deference to the democratic process alongside the potentially stark
consequences of the incompatibility finding, the court restricted its finding to section
72(10) because “the finding of incompatibility ought not to extend any further than
is necessary to deal with the facts of this case, and it is important that accrued rights
which are not affected by the incompatibility should not be interfered with.”40
The selection of a remedy must, therefore, be seen in the context of principle
set out by Lord Hope that repair of the section is for the democratically elected
Parliament. A court deciding that an Act of the Scottish Parliament is incompetent
can remove or suspend the retrospective effect of the decision.41 Any order varying
the normal temporal effect of a decision must have “regard to the extent to which
persons who are not parties to the proceedings would otherwise be adversely
affected.”42 The court considered that the effect of section 72(10) on landlords
was such that it could not suspend the retrospective effect of the decision,43
because to do so would constitute a breach of Convention rights by the court
under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.44 At the same time the potential
effects of the incompatibility on section 73 could cause substantial disruption to
closed transactions and prejudice to tenants.45 Lord Hope recognised that the
intricate legislative repair work needed to remove the incompatibility would have
to balance these concerns. The Parliamentary processes of consultation and debate,
with the benefit of the Scottish government’s assistance, were the appropriate
37 Para 49.
38 Para 51.
39 Para 50.
40 Para 51.
41 Scotland Act 1998 s 102(2)(a)–(b).
42 Section 102(3).
43 Salvesen at para 57.
44 Para 54. The court, of course, being a public authority for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998.
45 Para 55.
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institutional mechanism to evaluate and address such difficulties. It was recognised
that the necessary institutional response would take time, and this was something
the court could give by suspending the effect of its decision that section 72(10)
was not law for twelve months or such shorter period as required to address the
incompatibility.46
D. CONCLUSION
The decision in Salvesen is the first time that the UKSC has decided that an Act
of the Scottish Parliament contains provisions that are beyond the Parliament’s
competence. The substantive breach of A1P1 by section 72(10) is patent, and the
language used by judges in both the Inner House and the UKSC reflects that fact.
A question that looms large is why the pre-legislative safeguards to ensure that
legislation would be Convention compliant failed to pick up so clear a breach of
Convention rights. The presiding officer,47 law officers,48 ministers49 and ultimately,
if a little unfashionably, the members of the Scottish Parliament all have a role in
ensuring that the Parliament’s legislation is competent. Some cover might be found
in the convoluted drafting of the section, but it is hard to resist the conclusion that
the safeguards operated as an ineffective rubber-stamping exercise, or alternatively
people were asleep at the wheel. By any standard this was not the Parliament’s finest
hour in terms of legality.
The UKSC’s reaction to the (technical) incompetence is significant. This is the
latest in a series of decisions where the UKSC has explained the different roles
of the court and the Parliament, emphasising the respect that courts will accord
to the Parliament’s proper discretion when legislating. The court’s scrutiny of the
proportionality of the impugned provision quite properly showed deference to the
broad legislative discretion associated with A1P1. However, provisions which are
unfair, disproportionate and lacking in logical justification are outwith the parameters
of the legislature’s discretion. Nevertheless, the remedial response adopted by
the court demonstrates sensitivity to a number of factors and adopts an almost
co-operative approach: the Parliament’s democratic legitimacy and institutional
advantages make it the appropriate organ to rectify the problem, and that rectification
will be facilitated by the court’s order suspending the effect of the decision. In light
of the failure of pre-legislative scrutiny this does not necessarily inspire confidence.
Such a co-operative approach is made clearer by the UKSC explicitly granting
permission to the Lord Advocate to return to the Court of Session to ask for
further orders to assist with the process. Granting this permission not only hints
at a discursive co-operation generally, it also draws the Scottish government into
that discourse – the Lord Advocate is not the parliament’s law officer, he is the
46 Paras 57-58.
47 Scotland Act 1998 s 31(2).
48 Section 33(1).
49 Section 31(1). Note that now, though not when the legislation in this case was introduced, any person
“in charge of” a Bill must state whether he thinks it is within Parliament’s legislative competence.
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government’s – thus recognising the government’s interest as the instigator of the
2003 Act.50 The UKSC’s approach is also sensitive to its supra-jurisdictional role:
didactic provision of authoritative answers on the interpretation of the ECHR
and then remitting the entirety of the next stage to the Scottish institutions, is
consistent with the approach of supra-jurisdictional courts. So section 72(10) is
not law – and never has been – but the effects of that finding are postponed to
another day.
Daniel J Carr
University of Edinburgh
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Scotland: Twice as Much Criminal Law as England?
Concern has been expressed in recent times over the proliferation of criminal
offences.1 Claims that the UK Government had created over 3,000 offences in a ten
year period2 led to the introduction in England and Wales of a system whereby any
civil servant wishing to create a criminal offence needs to obtain “gateway clearance”
from the Secretary of State for Justice before doing so.3 No such mechanism exists
in Scotland, where the issue has received rather less attention.4 Yet the Scottish
Parliament has created criminal offences at a far greater rate than its English
counterpart. In this note we demonstrate that, over the course of a twelve month
period between 2010 to 2011, twice as many criminal offences applying to Scotland
were created compared to those applying to England. We analyse this difference and
demonstrate that over that period Holyrood showed a far greater propensity to create
criminal offences than Westminster, with 165 offences being created by Holyrood
for Scotland alone over that period as against a mere 10 created by Westminster for
England or England and Wales alone.
50 Cf the approach above, however.
1 See e.g. A Ashworth and L Zedner, “Defending the criminal law: reflections on the changing character
of crime, procedure and sanctions” (2008) 2 Criminal Law and Philosophy 21 at 22, 32; C Pantazis, “The
problem with criminalisation” (2008) 74 Criminal Justice Matters 10; A Crawford, “Governing through
anti-social behaviour: regulatory challenges to criminal justice” (2009) 49 BJ Crim 810 at 826.
2 See N Morris, “Blair’s ‘frenzied law making’: a new offence for every day spent in office”, The
Independent, 16 August 2006. In fact, the true figure is almost certainly much higher than this, with
1395 offences created in the first year of the New Labour government alone. See J Chalmers and F
Leverick, “Tracking the creation of criminal offences” [2013] Crim LR 543.
3 Ministry of Justice, Criminal Offences Gateway Guidance (2011), available via www.justice.gov.uk/
legislation/criminal-offences-gateway.
4 Although see P R Ferguson, “Criminal law and criminal justice: an exercise in adhocery”, in E E
Sutherland et al (eds), Law Making and the Scottish Parliament: The Early Years (2011) 208 at 216.
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A. THE STUDY
It is surprisingly difficult to find information about the number and characteristics of
criminal offences “on the books” in the UK. Criminal law teaching and scholarship
tends to focus on “core crimes”, such as offences against the person or the general
offences of dishonesty,5 but these account for only a tiny part of the criminal law.
Various attempts have been made to quantify the number of criminal offences in
existence in the UK, but these have tended to be limited in some way and have often
been by-products of analysis rather than its central focus.6
It was against this background that we embarked on a project intended to
rectify this lacuna. The aim of the project was not to identify every single criminal
offence on the books in the UK: this would have been a monumental undertaking
far beyond the resources we had at our disposal. Rather it was (a) to establish
a methodology for recording the number and characteristics of criminal offences
created during a particular period and (b) to carry out this exercise for two time
periods each of one year.7 The time periods selected were the first year of the
Coalition government (that is, all offences created from 6 May 2010 to 5 May 2011)
and the first year of the New Labour government (from 2 May 1997 to 1 May 1998).8
For each period, we reviewed all Acts of Parliament, Acts of the Scottish Parliament,
statutory instruments and Scottish statutory instruments to identify offence creating
provisions. The inclusion of secondary legislation in this exercise was important.
Attempts to estimate the number of criminal offences often ignore such instruments,
but far more offences are created via secondary legislation than via primary
legislation.9
Identifying an offence creating provision is, however, only the first stage in
any exercise aiming to record the number of criminal offences because a single
statutory provision can – and often does – create multiple offences.10 Our next task
was, therefore, to examine each offence creating provision with a view to determining
whether it created a single offence or multiple offences (and in the latter case
how many separate offences it created). For the most part, this was a reasonably
straightforward – if time consuming – exercise. In other instances, it was far more
5 W Stuntz, “The pathological politics of criminal law” (2001) 100 Michigan LR 505 at 512.
6 See Chalmers and Leverick (n 2) at 544-545.
7 We are grateful to the University of Edinburgh School of Law (where James Chalmers worked during
the initial stages of this research) for providing funding through its Strategic Investment Fund which
allowed us to employ Peter Lewin as a research assistant, and we are in turn grateful to Peter for his
hard work.
8 We treated the government’s first year in office as having begun the day after the relevant General
Election, and treated an offence as having been created on the day on which the relevant statute received
Royal Assent or the statutory instrument was made.
9 Our research found that 99 per cent of offences created in 1997-98 and 86 per cent of offences created
in 2010-11 were contained in secondary legislation. See Chalmers and Leverick (n 2) at 550.
10 See, for example, regulation 91(a) of The Feeding Stuffs (Establishments and Intermediaries)
Regulations 1998, a single statutory provision which prohibits 48 distinct acts or omissions, targeted
at varying audiences and often attracting different maximum penalties.
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Table 1. Offences created 1997-98 and 2010-11
Geographical extent 1997-1998 2010-2011
UK 1022 409
Britain 213 4
England None 212
England and Wales None 9
Wales None 314
Scotland 3 810
Northern Ireland 52 2
Isle of Man 53 None
Channel Islands 52 None
Total 1395 1760
problematic.11 It also proved surprisingly difficult sometimes to identify the nature
of the prohibited conduct, as legislative drafting techniques can be astonishingly
complex, rendering the results all but inaccessible except to those possessing dogged
persistence and not a small modicum of legal knowledge.12
Finally, once individual offences had been identified, we recorded for each offence
its salient characteristics, including its maximum penalty; its geographical extent; its
subject matter; any special capacity associated with it; and whether or not mens rea
was required.
B. CRIMINAL OFFENCES AND THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL
APPLICATION
We have presented elsewhere a more comprehensive report of the results of our
research.13 Here we wish to focus on just one aspect of the study: some interesting
differences that have emerged between Scotland and England and Wales in terms
of the number of offences created during the two time periods in question. Table 1
displays the number of offences created in each of these periods, both in total and
according to their geographical application.
As table 1 shows, the bare figures are astonishing – 1395 criminal offences were
created in 1997-98 and 1760 in 2010-11. But the geographical differences are also
interesting.
In 1997-98, there was very little difference between patterns of offence creation in
Scotland, England and Wales. The vast majority of criminal offences in the sample
extended either to “Great Britain” or to “the UK” and thus applied to all three
11 In J Chalmers and F Leverick, “Quantifying criminalisation”, in R A Duff et al (eds), Criminalization:
The Aims and Limits of the Criminal Law (forthcoming) we discuss in detail the methodological issues
that we faced and the solutions we adopted.
12 An issue we discuss in Chalmers and Leverick (n 2). See also J R Spencer, “The drafting of criminal
legislation: need it be so impenetrable?” (2008) 67 CLJ 585; P R Ferguson, “The drafting of offence
provisions by the Scottish Parliament” (2011) 32 Stat LR 161.
13 See Chalmers and Leverick (n 2). See also Chalmers and Leverick (n 11).
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jurisdictions. In 2010-11, however, the picture was very different. The number of
offences applying only to England was 212 (or, if those applying to “England and
Wales” are included, 221), whereas the number applying specifically to Scotland was
810. If the 413 criminal offences applying to the UK/Britain are added to these
figures, this means that almost twice as many offences were created in 2010-11 that
applied to Scotland (a total of 1223) compared to England (a total of 634).
The fact that it was more common in 2010-11 for offences to be created applying
only to one or more of the constituent parts of the UK is not, in itself, terribly
surprising. In 1997-98, the modern Scottish Parliament did not exist and thus
whenever a need arose to pass criminal legislation covering the whole of the UK– to
implement a European Directive requiring criminal measures, for example – this
would have been done by the way of a single legislative instrument. With the advent
of the Scottish Parliament (and the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland
Assembly), European legislation that lies within the legislative competence of these
law making institutions is frequently implemented separately for England, Wales,
Northern Ireland and Scotland.14
What is surprising is the fact that in 2010-11 so many more offences were created
by the Scottish Parliament compared to its Westminster counterpart (when the latter
was legislating specifically for England or for England and Wales).
C. ACCOUNTING FOR THE DIFFERENCE
The difference is a stark one. Although the “headline figures” indicate that twice as
many offences were created in Scotland as in England and Wales over 2010-11, if we
are to understand the difference we must strip out all those offences which applied
to the whole of the UK or to Britain. As we note above, in 2010-11 there were 810
offences created which applied to Scotland alone, compared to 221 which applied to
England or England and Wales alone.
Beyond this, we should disregard the relatively small number of offences created
at a “limited local level”:15 byelaws, transport and Work Act orders and harbour
orders. We should also disregard offences created in order to implement European
legislation – there is a significant difference over this period, but that seems largely
to be due to coincidences of time (because European obligations might have been
implemented within the time period we analysed for one part of the UK but
not another)16 or the use of consolidation instruments.17 Over time, the extent of
criminalisation based on European obligations should be very similar throughout
the UK.
14 See e.g. the Beef and Veal Labelling Regulations 2010, SI 2010/983; the Beef and Veal Labelling
(Scotland) Regulations 2010, SSI 2010/402; the Beef and Veal Labelling (Wales) Regulations 2010, SI
2011/991 (W 145); and the Beef and Veal Labelling (Northern Ireland) Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/155).
15 20 such offences were created in England over 2010-11 and five in Scotland.
16 See e.g. the Beef and Pig Carcase Classification (Scotland) Regulations 2010, SSI 2010/330 (which
fell within our sample period) and the corresponding English legislation, the Beef and Pig Carcase
Classification (England) Regulations 2010, SI 2010/1090 (which did not).
17 See e.g. the Water Environment (Controlled Activities) (Scotland) Regulations 2011, SSI 2011/209.
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All this only serves to make the difference more remarkable. It leaves 224 offences
created in Scotland over 2010-11, as compared to only ten in England. The English
offences comprised nine under the Health Protection (Local Authority Powers)
Regulations 201018 and one under the Health Protection (Notification) Regulations
2010.19 The 224 Scottish offences were found in one Act of the UK Parliament
(creating two offences),20 one statutory instrument (creating 57 offences)21 fifteen
Acts of the Scottish Parliament (creating 149 offences)22 and six Scottish statutory
instruments (creating 16 offences).23
We might disregard the 59 offences created for Scotland by UK legislation
as telling us nothing about Holyrood’s propensity to create criminal offences.
Nevertheless, that leaves 165 offences created by Holyrood for Scotland as compared
to ten created by Westminster for England.24 Why this remarkable difference?
At this stage in our work, any answer must be somewhat speculative. One obvious
possibility is that, because our analysis is framed around the date of a UK General
Election, we have examined a period in which Westminster was able to pass less
legislation than Holyrood. That seems correct: over the year, 14 Acts of Parliament
received Royal Assent, compared to 25 Acts of the Scottish Parliament.25
However, this is only a partial explanation, and it highlights one remarkable
fact. None of those 14 Acts of Parliament passed by Westminster created criminal
offences. By contrast, Holyrood appears to have great difficulty regulating without
criminalising: 15 of the 25 Scottish Acts created criminal offences.26 This is a common
pattern – legislation which is not on its face “criminal”27 will include a regulatory
scheme backed up by criminal penalties, such as failing to register transfers of land
or changes of landlord under the Crofting Reform (Scotland) Act 2010 or failing to
comply with notices issued under the Historic Environment (Amendment) (Scotland)
Act 2011.
It may often be legitimate to use the criminal law in this way, and at this stage
we pass no comment on the manner in which the Scottish Parliament has done so.
18 SI 2010/657.
19 SI 2010/659.
20 The Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011 part 1 of sch 4, which applies certain
provisions of the Representation of the People Act 1983 “with modifications” to the Alternative Vote
referendum.
21 The Scottish Parliament (Elections etc.) Order 2010, SI 2010/2999. This replaced an existing order and
so is unlikely to have created many – if any – new criminal offences, although we have not analysed this
directly.
22 In 2010: asp 9, 13, 14, 16, 17. In 2011: asp 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15.
23 SSI 2011/182, SSI 2011/183, SSI 2011/184, SSI 2011/185, SSI 2011/210 and SSI 2011/215.
24 Including offences created by the relevant governments by way of statutory instruments rather than by
Parliament itself.
25 Excluding one Private Act.
26 And two of those that did not were criminal procedure legislation: the Double Jeopardy (Scotland) Act
2011 and the Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010.
27 The Acts over this period which one might expect, on the basis of their short titles, to create offences
were the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 (29 offences); the Domestic Abuse
(Scotland) Act 2011 (one offence); the Forced Marriage etc (Protection and Jurisdiction) (Scotland)
Act 2011 (one offence); and possibly the Control of Dogs (Scotland) Act 2010 (one offence).
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The contrast with English legislation may suggest that the gateway procedure there
has been effective in its aims and that civil servants have sought to use the criminal
law as a tool of last resort in regulation, although the contrast may be due also to
differences in legislative subject matter. In this short note, however, we hope we have
demonstrated that Holyrood’s propensity to create criminal offences is a cause for
concern.
James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick
University of Glasgow
EdinLR Vol 17 pp 381-387
The Admissibility of Previous False Allegations of
Sexual Assault: CJM (No 2) v HM Advocate
A. BACKGROUND
CJM is an interesting, if inconclusive, High Court decision by a bench of five judges.1
Given its “very fact sensitive”2 nature, it is essential to rehearse the salient details. In
2011 the appellant was convicted of four charges relating to the sexual abuse of three
female children during the 1990s but the appeal was primarily concerned with the
testimony of only one of those victims, CD. The allegations were first made to the
police in 2008 by the other two victims, who were sisters, and CD then “reluctantly”
made a statement to the police in 2009 about the abuse perpetrated upon her by
the appellant between 1994 and 1998 when she was aged between 6 and 10.3 The
defence lodged a pre-trial application under section 275 of the Criminal Procedure
(Scotland) Act 19954 seeking permission to put to her that two and a half years before
making the current allegation, at which time she was 17, she had made a false claim to
the police of sexual assault by a third party. The defence argued that this was relevant
because it went to the credibility of CD’s complaint of historic sexual abuse.5
The allegedly false allegation related to an incident when CD and her friend
turned up at a house in the country, apparently distressed, claiming that they had
accepted a lift from a male who had driven them to some woods and asked them
to perform sexual acts for payment. The house’s occupant drove them home and
phoned the police the following day to check on their welfare. No complaint had been
received but the police traced and interviewed the two girls. CD repeated their earlier
account but her friend stated that they had willingly accompanied the man, to whom
1 CJM (No 2) v HM Advocate [2013] HCJAC 22.
2 CJM v HM Advocate [2012] HCJAC 83 at para 22.
3 CJM (No 2) at para 3.
4 Section 274 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 prohibits complainers in sexual offence trials
from being questioned about their sexual history or bad character (the “rape shield”), but s 275 sets out
an exception based on a three-stage test. See P Duff, “The Scottish ‘rape shield’: as good as it gets?”
(2011) 15 EdinLR 218.
5 CJM (No 2) at para 6.
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they had previously prostituted themselves, but that they had changed their minds
on this occasion. CD was re-interviewed two days later and admitted to fabricating
the allegations of abduction and unsolicited sexual demands, although other parts of
her account “were found to be factual”.6 She was cautioned and charged with wasting
police time but no prosecution followed.
At a preliminary hearing, the section 275 application was refused on the grounds
that the evidence was “collateral and inadmissible at common law” and “[i]n any event
it is not relevant”.7 It was renewed at trial before a different judge but refused on the
ground that no “special cause” had been shown to justify it.8 The trial judge observed
that, in any event, it was “collateral” under the common law “having regard to the
time and circumstances of the charge.” In addition, under the statutory rape shield,
it did not pass the third leg of the relevant test under section 2759 because it was
likely to divert the jury’s attention from the real issue before them and would have
“seriously invaded” the complainer’s “privacy and dignity”.10 At the initial appeal
hearing, the court was firmly of the opinion that the evidence was collateral and,
as such, not generally admissible at common law.11 It was accepted that “at least
an element in the rationale” for this rule was “expediency”, because dealing with
collateral matters “might often protract proceedings and obscure the true issue
which [is] being tried”.12 The Lord Justice General took the view that it did not fall
under the very limited exceptions to that policy, distinguishing it on the facts from
decisions by single judges in Green and Leitch v HM Advocate13 and HM Advocate
v Ronald (No 1).14 Both cases involved complainers with psychological conditions
which contributed to a propensity to make false complaints. However, Lords Clarke
and Philip expressed doubt as to whether, as regards a false prior complaint against
a third party, a distinction could be drawn between “a single such complaint and an
underlying psychological or similar disposition to make such complaints”. The appeal
was thus remitted to a bench of five judges “in order that a full and authoritative
6 These are the fiscal’s words, quoted by Lord Carloway in CJM (No 2) at para 5.
7 The judge’s “remarkably brief report” is quoted by Lord Carloway in CJM (No 2) at para 6. The rest of
the procedural history is narrated at paras 7-9. See also CJM v HM Advocate [2012] HCJAC 83 at paras
5-7.
8 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s 275B.
9 Under s 275(1)(c) the “probative value of the evidence” must “outweigh any risk of prejudice to the
proper administration of justice” and s 275(2)(b) states the latter includes “the appropriate protection of
a complainer’s dignity and privacy”.
10 CJM (No 2) at para 9.
11 CJM v HM Advocate [2012] HCJAC 83 at paras 11-17.
12 Para 20. The Lord Justice General cites the latter phrase from Dickie v HM Advocate (1897) 24 R(J)
82 at 83-84, generally regarded as the classic statement in trials for sexual offences where the defence
seeks to use previous sexual history or bad character in order to attack the complainer’s credibility.
13 1983 SCCR 42. This is not a particularly helpful decision because following a “fresh evidence” appeal,
initially remitted to Lord Cameron to hear from several witnesses on various matters including evidence
of the complainer’s psychiatric disturbance and two false previous allegations of rape, the Crown did
not support the conviction at appeal and the admissibility of the previous allegedly false complaints was
never determined.
14 2007 SCCR 451.
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review” of this issue could take place.15 Ironically, the full bench did not resolve this
matter.
B. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF A COLLATERAL ISSUE
As a preliminary point, the Lord Justice-Clerk (Carloway), who gave the leading
opinion, determined that the complainer’s earlier allegation was not relevant at
common law because the incident “was not linked in time, circumstances or place”
to the current charge.16 He reiterated dicta from previous decisions to emphasise
that section 275 does not provide a gateway whereby evidence which would not
be relevant at common law may be admitted.17 The court’s view that the earlier
allegation was irrelevant because the circumstances were entirely different seems
entirely correct and, in one sense, that concluded the instant appeal. Nevertheless,
the court, quite correctly given the case had been remitted to it to provide guidance
on a difficult issue, went on to consider whether a prior false complaint (if relevant)
was inadmissible as a “collateral issue”. Lord Carloway began by observing that the
only significance of the evidence would be to undermine the complainer’s credibility.
The starting point was the common law, under which evidence of “bad character
is, in general inadmissible. . . because it is collateral” to the issue at trial.18 A brief
review of the authorities indicated that this “well tried and tested rule” existed for
“pragmatic reasons”, primarily to avoid wasting time and confusing the jury with
issues of dubious relevance, but also to protect witnesses from unexpected attacks
which are difficult to defend. However, Lord Carloway acknowledged that there
are “recognised exceptions” to this rule,19 two of which were potentially applicable
here.
(1) Proven dishonesty of a witness
The first exception to the rule that the general bad character of a witness is
inadmissible as a collateral issue arises where the dishonesty of a witness can be
proved by reference to established fact in the form of a previous conviction. The
problem here, however, was that there was no prosecution or conviction for wasting
police time, the reasons for which are not clear.20 Lord Carloway went on to
explain that permitting an exploration of the earlier allegation might have resulted
in a prolonged “trial within a trial”, in an attempt to ascertain precisely what had
happened. The complainer had not retracted all of her account, even if she did retract
15 CJM v HM Advocate [2012] HCJAC 83 at paras 18-20.
16 CJM (No 2) at para 34, clearly paraphrasing theMoorov doctrine.
17 Paras 34 and 44, see also Lord Clarke at para 51.The leading authority isMoir v HM Advocate 2007 JC
131 at paras 27 (Lord Johnston), 41 (Lord Eassie) and 44 (Lord Marnoch). See Duff (n 4) at 232.
18 CJM (No 2) at paras 27-29.
19 Para 32.
20 Paras 32-33.
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parts of it, and “for reasons of expediency” that episode was a “collateral matter”
excluded by common law.21
Lord Clarke agreed entirely that “the conduct of litigation. . . requires to be
governed by considerations of experience and practicality”. However, he was keen
to distinguish two different reasons under common law for exclusion of prior
false allegations – irrelevance and being collateral, emphasising that “the words
‘collateral’ and ‘irrelevant’ do not amount to the same thing”. He sounded a note
of caution against “the term ‘collateral’. . . being used too readily” to exclude “highly
relevant” evidence, “the exclusion of which might properly be regarded as involving
unfairness”. In the present context, he could not accept that “the test of relevancy
falls to be determined simply by the nature of the evidence available to establish
the falsity of the allegations”. That was an overly “prescriptive regime” and if prior
false allegations were relevant, then it was a separate matter whether they should
be dismissed as collateral, the ease of proving them false having to be balanced
against the probative value of such evidence.22 However, Lord Clarke accepted
that in this case the prior allegation was of little relevance because of the differing
circumstances and the steps necessary to investigate its alleged falsity would be
“disproportionate”.23
In view of the divergent views of Lords Carloway and Clarke as to the appropriate
common law approach, it is worth expanding upon the problems relating to collateral
matters. Imagine if the prior allegation had been put to the complainer at trial and
she had claimed that her initial report to the police was in fact true, explaining
that she had been persuaded by the police to withdraw parts of her story because,
for instance, the other girl had not wanted to become involved in corroborating
her account. Recent empirical research carried out in England has shown that the
police are only too willing to categorise allegations of rape as “false” where inessential
details in the complainer’s account turn out to be inaccurate even though the main
thrust of her story may well be true.24 As Lord Carloway perceptively observed,
“it is clear that the complainer did not retract the whole of her account. Even if
she did retract parts of it, that is not to say that it did not happen.”25 Once the
matter had been raised, fairness to the complainer would have required the truth
of the earlier allegation to be explored at the trial, which might mean having to
hear evidence from relevant witnesses. The jury would then have to determine
whether her previous complaint was well founded before going on to consider the
matter at issue, namely whether her allegations of childhood sexual abuse were
credible. It is easy to see how such “satellite litigation” would extend proceedings
and might distract the jury from the principal issue.26 In that light one can readily
21 Para 35.
22 Paras 50-51.
23 Para 51.
24 C L Saunders, “The truth, the half-truth, and nothing like the truth” (2012) 52 BJ Crim 1152.
25 CJM (No 2) at para 35.
26 For instance, R v O’Dowd [2009] EWCA 905 where a rape trial took over 6 months. In allowing
an appeal, the Court of Appeal commented (at para 3) that “if ever there is case to illustrate the
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understand Lord Carloway’s insistence that a prior allegation is only admissible if
its falsity is “an established fact”, as proven by a criminal conviction, although I
prefer Lord Clarke’s more nuanced view that expediency should be tempered by
the avoidance of injustice on occasion, necessitating balancing the potential probative
value of the evidence against the practical problems of investigating the allegedly false
claim.
(2) Expert evidence of a “condition” and the decision in HM Advocate v
Ronald (No 1)27
The court also considered the claim that the complainer’s prior, allegedly false,
allegation was proof of a “condition or predisposition” affecting her credibility, and
as such was admissible under the rape shield.28 Lord Carloway first considered
the position at common law because, as we have seen, if such evidence was
inadmissible at common law, the rape shield did not provide an additional gateway.29
At common law, Lord Carloway explained, a previous false allegation may be led,
as an exception to the general rule that evidence of bad character is inadmissible
as a collateral issue, where the witness suffers from a “condition” affecting his
or her credibility.30 In his view this only applies where there is expert evidence
that the witness suffers from an “objective medical condition”31 and if there is
no such evidence, as in the present case, “the matter stops there as a matter of
expediency”.32 In so far as the decision in Ronald seemed to depart from this
principle, he invited the court to disapprove the case.33 Lord Clarke observed that
disapproving Ronald was not necessary for the disposal of the present case,34 and
the other three judges voiced no opinion on the matter. Having disposed of the issue
under common law, Lord Carloway also noted that to be admissible under the rape
shield35 the “condition” or “predisposition” requires to be one which is “objectively
dangers of satellite litigation through the introduction of bad character evidence this is it”. See also D
Thomas, “Sexual history evidence: whether defendant charged with sexual assault able to cross-examine
complainant about previous false rape complaint” [2010] Crim LR 79; and N Kibble, “Sexual offences:
whether rape complainant’s previous false complaint ‘misconduct’ is result of personality problems”
[2011] Crim LR 818.
27 2007 SCCR 451.
28 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s 275(1)(a)(ii).
29 See text at n 17 above and CJM (No 2) at para 46.
30 Paras 36-41. See also paras 27-29.
31 Paras 36-41.
32 Para 39.
33 Para 41.
34 Para 53. He also noted that, in his view, disapproving Ronald would also involve disapproving the
appellate judgement in Green and Leech v HM Advocate 1983 SCCR 42 and Lord Macphail’s dicta in
HM Advocate v A 2005 SLT 975.
35 Section 275(1)(a) requires that such evidence “demonstrate . . . any condition or predisposition to which
the complainer is or has been subject”.
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diagnosable in medical, notably psychiatric, terms”, which was not the case
here.36
Ronald involved a defence of consent to an alleged rape in 2005 in which
the trial judge, Lord Hodge, had to determine whether a psychiatrist could give
evidence not only about the complainer’s borderline personality disorder and alcohol
dependency syndrome but also about other aspects of her behaviour which had led
to the diagnosis. These included previous, dubious allegations of rape made by her
concerning a historic incident in the early 1990s (which she reported in 2005) and
a more recent incident, reported contemporaneously, in 2002.37 The defence also
proposed to lead evidence of the inconsistent accounts she had given to psychiatrists
and the police about both of these incidents.38 In the psychiatrist’s view, the previous
allegations were manifestations of the diagnosed personality disorder, including a
tendency to act impulsively, a lack of self control, and emotional instability which,
along with the alcohol dependency, rendered allegations by a person suffering from
these disorders potentially unreliable.39
Lord Hodge thought this evidence was admissible at common law because it was,
in essence, expert evidence bearing on the effect of “diagnosed mental conditions
on the general reliability of a witness” including reference to the factors which had
informed the expert’s opinion, amongst which were the earlier rape allegations.40
Thus, he concluded that it would neither be “expedient (n)or in the interests of
justice” to exclude this evidence at common law41 and, for the same reasons, it
could be admitted under section 275 of the rape shield, although this might limit the
extent of what precisely could be led.42 This was the aspect of Ronald with which
Lord Carloway disagreed in CJM because, while accepting that the psychiatrist’s
evidence that the complainer suffered from psychiatric conditions was admissible,
he thought that the “remaining elements” ought to be been have excluded. In his
view the testimony of the psychiatrist and other witnesses about the complainer’s
previous “unrelated”43 impulsive behaviour in entering sexual relationships and
falsely reporting abuse was inadmissible as collateral evidence.44 Lord Carloway
observed that the use of a “member of the medical profession” to “narrate these
events, as revealed to him in the hearsay reports of third parties and otherwise”
did not render it admissible. In short, he objected to the defence smuggling,
36 CJM (No 2) at para 46. See also Moir v HM Advocate 2007 JC 131, where Lord Johnson concluded
“with some hesitation” that s 275(1)(a) requires a “recognised medical condition . . . and not just to
some vague notion of tendency or similar leanings” in the actions of the complainer (para 31).
37 Ronald at para 26. In Lord Hodge’s view, this was not inconsistent with the above dicta fromMoir.
38 As I remarked in Duff (n 4) at n 67, the decision to prosecute in Ronald was perhaps surprising,
although possibly a result of the political pressures on the Crown Office in rape cases, and the accused
was found not guilty.
39 Ronald at paras 14, 15, 18 and 26.
40 Paras 18-19 and 31.
41 Para 23.
42 Paras 25-32.
43 One might query whether the previous allegations were “unrelated”. I suspect they would have satisfied
aMoorov-type test.
44 CJM (No 2) at paras 39-40.
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as he saw it, this evidence into the trial using the vehicle of expert psychiatric
testimony.
In my view, however, Lord Hodge was justified in concluding that the evidence was
relevant (owing to the similarity of the previous allegations and the instant charge)
and that its admission was in the interests of justice. It would have been grossly unfair
to the accused to exclude it because it went directly to the “central importance” of
the complainer’s credibility and reliability in a rape case where the issue was one
of consent.45 Thus, I disagree with Lord Carloway’s disapprobation of Ronald and
would support Lord Clarke’s clear reluctance to disapprove the decision. That, of
course, leaves the law in a state of some uncertainty but this seems inevitable when
the courts are trying to arrive at an appropriate balance between expediency and
justice in a particular case. Thus, it would be sensible to resist the understandable
temptation to seek certainty by creating a rigid rule against the admissibility of
previous, potentially false, allegations based on somewhat arbitrarily limiting the
factors which a psychiatrist can cite as contributing to the diagnosis of the medical
condition of a witness.
C. CONCLUSION
As was acknowledged in CJM and CJM (No 2), the “collateral finality”46 rule is very
“fact sensitive”.47 Consequently, it is extremely difficult to define the scope of the
exceptions to the general rule that evidence of the bad character of a witness is
inadmissible. One cannot simply implement a blanket rule which invariably sacrifices
justice in the interests of expediency, which would be the result of applying Lord
Carloway’s dicta in CJM (No 2). In my view, Lord Clarke’s more flexible approach
is preferable. While it entails a strong presumption that investigation of “collateral
issues” should be avoided as a matter of expediency, it acknowledges that the interests
of justice may override this general principle. The divergence of opinion between
their lordships means that the full bench in CJM (No 2) did not provide any conclu-
sive answers as regards the admissibility of, first, previous false allegations of a similar
nature and, second, the nature of the evidence that may be provided by an expert
witness to support a diagnosis that a witness suffers from a condition which affects his
or her credibility. In my view, the attempt to formulate definitive rules or formulae to
delimit the scope of these exceptions is akin to the search for the Holy Grail. The ap-
propriate balance to be drawn between expediency and justice always depends on the
infinitely variable facts of the case in question and a degree of discretion must remain
with the trial judge to determine whether the evidence at issue should be admitted.
Peter Duff
University of Aberdeen
45 Ronald at paras 27-28.
46 P Roberts and A Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, 2nd edn (2010), 351.
47 CJM v HM Advocate [2012] HCJAC 83 at para 22. See also CJM (No 2) at para 28 per Lord Carloway
and at para 50 per Lord Clarke, and the discussion in Roberts and Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (n
46) 351-363.
388 the edinburgh law review Vol 17 2013
EdinLR Vol 17 pp 388-394
“Accession to Delinquence”: Frank Houlgate
Investment Co Ltd (FHI) v Biggart Baillie LLP
At the centre of the litigation between Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd (“FHI”)
and Biggart Baillie LLP (“BB”), now ongoing for several years, is a mortgage fraud
perpetrated upon FHI by one of BB’s clients. In 2009 Lord Drummond Young
dismissed as irrelevant a claim for £300,000 brought by FHI on grounds that BB
had failed in a duty of care owed in negligence towards it, and that, as agents of the
fraudster, BB had breached its implied warranty of authority.1 A reclaiming motion
was lodged, and the Inner House permitted the pleadings to be amended, which
resulted in the case being remitted to the Outer House. After a further debate in
2011, Lord Glennie was not persuaded by the amended pleadings with regard to
negligence and breach of warranty of authority, but he did allow a claim for £100,000,
based upon BB’s participation in its client’s fraud, to proceed to proof.2 The report
now published is that of the proof, at which Lord Hodge found BB liable “as an
accessory to fraud”.3
A. THE FACTS
The facts demonstrate the breathtaking simplicity of identity theft. In 2004 Frank
Houlgate, founding director and shareholder in FHI, had been introduced to a John
MacGregor Cameron (“JMC”), a Leeds businessman who claimed to be seeking
investors for his company. JMC proposed to offer as security his ancestral estate
in Scotland, Balbuthie Farm in Fife. Houlgate made enquiries and ascertained that
Balbuthie Farm was indeed owned by a John Cameron, and JMC duly took Houlgate
to look over the property, explaining that they could not enter the farmhouse as the
“tenants” had not been warned of his development plans. GregorMair, then a director
of BB, was instructed to act on JMC’s behalf, an “all sums” standard security was
drawn up in favour of FHI, and substantial amounts were advanced.
Undetected by BB,4 however, the true owner of Balbuthie was in fact a John Bell
Cameron (“JBC”). Eventually the “true” JBC discovered that his identity had been
1 Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP [2009] CSOH 165, 2010 SLT 527.
2 Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP [2011] CSOH 160, 2012 SLT 256; for
commentary see K G C Reid and G L Gretton, Conveyancing 2011 (2012) 121-125; R Macpherson,
“Lender claims against solicitors: some thoughts from Scotland” (2012) 28 Professional Negligence 123.
3 Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP [2013] CSOH 80 at para 50.
4 Mair had queried the discrepancy in names on the title sheet. JMC first advised that this was an error,
and should read “John and Bell Cameron”, since the farm was owned in common by him and a cousin
named Bell. He then changed his story to the effect that he had used different middle-names to keep
this transaction separate from his dealings as a Lloyds “name”. Only a copy of the land certificate was
produced, not the principal, and a substitute was eventually procured.
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appropriated in another transaction and he instructed his own solicitors, Stephenson
and Marshall, to make enquiries. Since BB had been named as JBC’s solicitors in
that transaction, Stephenson and Marshall wrote to BB, in January 2007, to clarify
the position. From that point on, BB was left in no doubt that its client was not the
owner of Balbuthie Farm, and JMC confessed as much to Mair shortly afterwards.
Uncertain as to the exact extent of his duty of confidentiality towards his client, Mair
did not, however, warn FHI or FHI’s agents of the fraud in relation to Balbuthie farm,
far less report the matter to the Serious Organised Crime Agency or contact the Law
Society for advice. He did advise his client as a matter of urgency that the security
should be discharged, but allowed himself to be misled by false assurances that his
client was in discussion with FHI to pay off his debt. In late January, still unaware
of these developments, FHI advanced a further £100,000 to JMC, the sum claimed
in this stage of proceedings. JMC notified Mair in June 2007 that a deal had been
reached and a discharge should be drawn up. Mair sent the discharge to JMC who
forged the signatures and the deed was duly sent to the Land Register. The fraudulent
standard security was thus removed from the Register by a forged discharge.
In July 2007 FHI discovered that JMC had previously been convicted of fraud and
that he did not own Balbuthie, and the deceit thereafter unravelled. Stevenson and
Marshall were instructed to act for FHI, and a complaint was made to the Law Society
regarding Mair’s conduct. In May 2009 Mair pled guilty before the Scottish Solicitors
Discipline Tribunal, which censured him and imposed a fine for continuing to act for
JMC when he was aware of the fraud, failing to contact the money laundering officer
in his firm, and, despite the risk of further impropriety, sending the discharge to JMC
instead of direct to FHI.5
B. “ACCESSION TO DELINQUENCE”: CROSSBORDER DIFFERENCE?
In giving judgment against BB, Lord Hodge conceded that it might be “possible to
analyse liability. . . in terms of implied representation”, but he was not persuaded to
read into Mair’s actions any representation of JMC’s identity or title and he discarded
such an argument as “unnecessarily complicated”.6 The “more direct analysis” was
that “Mair had to dissociate himself from the fraud and alert FHI to the risk of further
loss if he wished to avoid liability as accessory to the fraud.”7
The fundamental proposition upon which this case rested, therefore, was that
delictual liability may derive not only from the conduct of the principal wrongdoers
but also of those who “are but accessory”.8 Counsel for the pursuer found authority in
Stair’s statement that “accession to delinquence”, whether “anterior, concomitant, or
5 Its findings are available at http://www.ssdt.org.uk/findings/findings/1463_Mair_G(2).pdf.
6 [2013] CSOH 80 at para 37, referring to Cheshire Mortgage Corp Ltd v Grandison [2012] CSIH 66,
[2013] PNLR 3.
7 At para 37.
8 Stair, Inst 1.9.5.
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posterior”, resulted in the accessory being held liable.9 The notion that the rules on
accession to crimes might readily be translated across to civil liability was supported
by twentieth-century case-law.10 Lord Hodge noted that an analogy could validly be
drawn with the criminal law and the circumstances in which failure to intervene made
a party an accessory to a crime.11 And although they did of course dispute that Mair’s
conduct was in fact accessory to the fraud, it would appear that the defenders did not
offer any serious challenge to this general principle.
Across the border in England, however, opinions are divided on the liability
of accessories. A person who aids and abets a crime is held to have committed
that crime,12 and dishonestly assisting another to commit a breach of trust is itself
an equitable wrong,13 but accessory liability in tort is more contentious. Glanville
Williams acknowledged that “[t]he law relating to parties to a tort has not been so
well worked out as that relating to parties to a crime”,14 but in discussing “principal[s]
in the second degree to a tort” he instanced various intentional torts for which “joint”
responsibility might arise, so that, for example, “if B comes in aid of A, who beats me,
although B did nothing against me, still he is a trespasser as well as A”.15 Atiyah and
Fleming similarly identified “cogent support both in principle and ancient authority
for the suggestion that the requisite degree of participation may well correspond
with the description attached by the criminal law to principals in the first and second
degree”.16
The English courts, on the other hand, have taken a more restricted view. In
Credit Lyonnais v Export Credits Guarantee Department Hobhouse LJ stated in the
Court of Appeal that “knowing assistance is not enough to found tortious liability”,17
and the House of Lords in that case rejected any analogy with the criminal law as
“unhelpful”.18 Indeed, in Fish & Fish Ltd v Sea Shepherd UK, in a judgment issued
just twelve days prior to that of Lord Hodge, Beatson LJ reviewed the authorities
in detail and asserted as the common law rule: “the law of tort does not recognise
9 Ibid, as noted by Lord Hodge at para 26. Further Institutional authority on the liability of “accessories
to a delinquency” was not cited but may be found in Bankton, Inst 1.10.46 (vol 1, 254), and in Erskine,
Inst 3.1.15.
10 Para 40, referring to the opinion of the Lord Ordinary, Lord Skerrington, in Cairns v Harry Walker Ltd
1914 SC 51 at 54, who discussed “the summary of the criminal law as to accession given in Macdonald’s
Criminal Law (3rd ed), p 6” and saw “no reason why a different rule should apply in the case of a civil
delict”. (The case is mistakenly cited as Cairns v Henry Walker.)
11 Para 43.
12 Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 s 8.
13 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164.
14 G L Williams, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence (1951) 11.
15 Williams, Joint Torts (n 14) at 12, citing Boyce v Douglass (1807) 1 Camp 60, 170 ER 875.
16 C Sappideen and P Vines (eds), Fleming’s Law of Torts, 10th edn (2011) para 11.20 (text appears also in
Fleming’s earlier editions) 256; see also P S Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (1967) 295,
and to similar effect P Sales, “The tort of conspiracy and civil secondary liability” (1990) 49 CLJ 491 at
509.
17 [1998] 1 LL Rep 19 at 44.
18 [2000] 1 AC 486 at 500 per Lord Woolf, echoing views on the distinctiveness of crime and tort as
expressed in CBC Songs Ltd v Amstrad plc [1988] AC 1013.
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true accessory liability, only joint liability where the person who can be termed the
actual perpetrator is the agent of another person”.19 He acknowledged the work of
academic commentators who have continued to argue otherwise,20 but insisted that
“the fact that a person has facilitated the doing of a tortious act by another is not in
itself sufficient to make him liable in tort. This is so even where the facilitation is
done knowingly.”21 This stance also finds academic support, including from Weir,22
Carty,23 Stevens,24 and McBride and Bagshaw.25 It seems, therefore, that the English
courts recognise “joint tortfeasance” where the defender has “procured”, “ratified”
or “authorised” the tort of another in some way26 or where the defender has acted
tortiously with another in furtherance of a “common design”,27 but not where he or
she has merely assisted or facilitated another’s tort.28 It is not clear that Mair’s conduct
would fall within the scope of accessory liability thus circumscribed. Mair’s inaction
after his discovery of his client’s deception was professionally reprehensible, and was
causally linked to FHI’s further advance of £100,000, but he could not be said to have
“procured” JMC’s deceit, nor to have acted with him in pursuance of a “common
design”.
The narrow “English” approach to “secondary” wrongdoing was, however, followed
in a recent Scots case, admittedly in circumstances very different from those of
Frank Houlgate. In Cairn Energy plc v Greenpeace29 Lord Glennie (who in Frank
Houlgate had recognised the relevancy of a case based upon the defenders’ “knowing
participation in and furtherance of” JMC’s fraud) was persuaded by English authority
to the effect that secondary liability in delict could arise only by “procurement” or by
participation in a “common design”.30 On this basis he found that, for the purposes of
granting interdict, an international organisation was not a joint wrongdoer with local
activists in “storming” the pursuers’ Edinburgh offices, even though it was responsible
for the international campaign within which those individuals were acting. At the
19 [2013] EWCA Civ 544 at para 42.
20 Ibid, citing P SDavies “Accessory liability for assisting torts” (2011) 70 CLJ 353; J Dietrich, “Accessorial
liability in the law of torts” (2011) 31 LS 231. See also S Deakin et al, Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort
Law, 7th edn (2013) 888.
21 Fish and Fish at para 41. See also Sabaf SpA v Meneghetti Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 976, [2003] RPC 14,
aff’d [2004] UKHL 45.
22 T Weir, Economic Torts (1997) 32 n 31.
23 H Carty, “Joint tortfeasance and assistance liability” (1999) 19 LS 489.
24 R H Stevens, Torts and Rights (2007) 256-257.
25 N J McBride and R Bagshaw, Tort Law, 4th edn (2012) 860-864.
26 McBride and Bagshaw, Tort Law (n 25) 860-861.
27 The Koursk [1924] P 140; Fish & Fish Ltd v Sea Shepherd UK [2013] EWCA Civ 544 at para 45 per
Beatson LJ; McBride and Bagshaw, Tort Law (n 25) 862.
28 On the difficulties of distinguishing assistance from procuring or participation, however, see Dietrich (n
20) at 245, and consider Gale v Shah [2005] EWHC 1087 (QB) in which the defendant identified the
house of a person whom she knew her companions would attack, and was thus involved in a “common
design” to harm the victim, rather than merely “assisting” the wrongdoers.
29 2013 SLT 570.
30 At paras 24-28.
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same time, it should be noted that the Scots authorities reviewed in Frank Houlgate
do not appear to have been considered in Cairn Energy.
Future developments are awaited with interest therefore. Plainly the Scots courts
are not bound by English authorities, but the implications of a more or less expansive
approach to accessory liability merit careful consideration. The nub of arguments
against a broader doctrine is that this “risks uncertainty and the inhibition of perfectly
legitimate activities”.31 Accessory liability is potentially boundless, from a shopkeeper
selling a kitchen knife to an individual who later uses it to commit murder, to a
public authority landlord failing to warn a murder victim that one of its tenants had a
grievance against him.32 It should also be remembered that accessory liability is cast
as a form of joint liability,33 which entails that, as in Frank Houlgate, the pursuer
may recover the total loss from the accessory who thereby bears the risk of the
principal wrongdoer’s insolvency. But if the accessory is culpable to a lesser degree,34
is it acceptable that the accessory should find himself or herself liable for the whole
amount? After all in analogous circumstances the criminal law can apply different
sanctions to principal and accessory.
Others have contended that “expanding the scope of accessory liability would help
to protect rights, deter wrongs, and sanction the culpable”,35 and that concerns over
indeterminate liability might be addressed in English law by the use of control devices
to separate out accessories “in law” from the huge potential number of accessories
“in fact”. In particular, accessory liability might require: (i) a significant level of
“involvement” on the part of the accessory, in the sense of “conduct that increases
the likelihood of the commission of the tort”;36 and (ii) “mens rea” meaning that
the “accessory had knowledge of the essential matters of the tort that the [primary
tortfeasor] intends to commit when involving himself or herself in the [primary
tortfeasor’s] conduct”.37 As it happens, limitations of this nature are given useful
discussion in Frank Houlgate.
C. THE LIMITS OF ACCESSORY LIABILITY
(1) The connection between the accessory’s conduct and the wrongdoing
An obvious limitation on accessory liability is that a strong connection should be made
out between the accessory’s conduct and the wrongdoing. In Frank Houlgate Lord
Hodge applied a straightforward “but for” test, ruling that but for Mair’s failure to
reveal the fraud FHI would not have provided the further advance of £100,000, and so
31 Fish & Fish Ltd v Sea Shepherd UK [2013] EWCA Civ 544 at para 44 per Beatson LJ; see further
McBride and Bagshaw, Tort Law (n 25) 863, arguing that penalising those who knowingly assist a
tort would result in uncertainty similar to that which surrounds liability for knowingly receiving assets
disposed of in breach of trust.
32 The scenario in which no duty of care was held to exist inMitchell v Glasgow CC 2009 SC (HL) 21.
33 Stair, Inst 1.5.9.
34 As discussed below in section C.
35 Davies (n 20) at 380.
36 Dietrich (n 20) at 243.
37 At 258.
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in that sense BB “caused FHI to lose that sum”.38 A factual causal link was therefore
identified between BB’s conduct and the loss. But is the relevant link that which exists
between the accessory’s conduct and the loss itself, as indicated in Frank Houlgate,
or between the accessory’s conduct and the conduct of the principal wrongdoer?
The latter approach seems to match Stair’s characterisation of accession as “anterior,
concomitant or posterior to the delinquence itself”, whether by “counsel, instigation
or provocation. . . connivance. . . not hindering”, assisting, abetting or “ratihabition,
approbation, praise. . . or support of the delinquents”.39 It is also consistent with the
analysis of complicity in criminal acts.40
A second potential problem is that, given the complex fact patterns of accessory
liability, the “but for” causation test may yield not only too many positive results (as in
the case of the shopkeeper selling the knife to the would-be murderer) but also, on
occasion, false negatives. For example, it might be possible to show that even without
the accessory’s support, a determined wrongdoer would have gone ahead regardless
and found other assistance to commit the wrong. The “but for” test is not satisfied,
but should the accessory escape liability where he or she has, in Dietrich’s words,
“increased the likelihood of commission of a wrong”?41 The precise nature of the
connection between conduct and wrongdoing will no doubt require further judicial
elaboration, but in all cases the scope of liability must be further adjusted by reference
to the “mens rea” on the part of the accessory.
(2) The mental element on the part of the accessory
In Frank Houlgate the accessory’s state of mind was very different from that of the
principal wrongdoer. On any view JMC had fraudulent intent; the unfortunate Mair,
on the other hand, was said to have persisted in a state of “wishful unthinking” after
discovery of JMC’s deception.42 However, LordHodge set out the important principle
that “in our law a person can make himself an accessory to a delict without having the
mental element necessary for commission of the delict itself”.43 The idea of differing
levels of culpability between accessory and principal has been taken up elsewhere.44
Indeed, a “two-tier” approach to assessing the mental element can be observed in the
38 Para 49.
39 Stair, Inst 1.5.9.
40 The criminal law analogy is discussed further in Davies (n 20) at 354-357, and see J Gardner,
“Complicity and causality”, in Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal
Law (2007) 57 at 76: “The essential difference between accomplices and principals is that accomplices
bring wrongdoing into the world through principals. . . An accomplice is one who acts with the
consequence or result that the principal commits the wrong.”
41 Dietrich (n 20) at 243.
42 [2013] CSOH 80 at para 42 per Lord Hodge.
43 Para 40.
44 See e.g. Williams, Joint Torts (n 14) at 15, suggesting that there may be circumstances in which “each
defendant should as a matter of justice be considered separately”. Fraud was not included specifically
in the list of intentional torts discussed by Williams, but he noted the problems of joint libel, where in
relation to qualified privilege, it might be appropriate to look for differing levels of “malice” as between
the wrongdoers.
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US Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 14 which provides for
liability on the part of a person who, negligently or otherwise, has failed to protect the
plaintiff “from the specific risk of an intentional tort” at the hand of another. At the
same time, it is important to state clearly the minimum threshold of culpability.
“Subjective dishonesty” is said not to be essential, but while “some knowledge and
a failure to enquire might suffice” for fraud in the wider sense of bad faith in contract
law, Lord Hodge suggested that “actual knowledge” might be required for accession
to fraud in delict.45 The necessary mental element was inferred here from Mair’s
inaction on acquiring actual knowledge of the fraud in the midst of a live transaction,
given the foreseeability that if he did not act, further funds would be obtained from
the pursuer.46 This seems therefore to entail a form of recklessness, in the sense of
indifference to the probable and known risk of wrongdoing by the principal. At the
same time, the decision in Frank Houlgate signals that one may become an accessory
to a delict through inaction, in circumstances where no primary duty of care existed
in negligence, and without the level of culpability necessary for commission of the
delict as principal. A cautious steer may be required on this point, therefore, in order
to prevent subversion of the law of negligence, in which foreseeability alone is not
generally sufficient to ground a positive duty to prevent a person from being harmed
by the criminal act of a third party.
Elspeth Reid
University of Edinburgh
EdinLR Vol 17 pp 394-398
Batman Fails to Heed the Lone Ranger
and Gets Hurt. . . Ha Ha!
Sometimes it is unwise to disregard advice. When that advice consists of an instruction
not to leave the path, ignoring it may prove perilous indeed. Contrary to the clear
instruction of her mother, Little Red Riding Hood left the path to pick flowers, giving
the wolf the opportunity to reach her grandmother’s house ahead of her.1 Had twelve
dwarves paid closer attention to Gandalf’s parting injunction at the edge of Mirkwood
(“Good-bye! Be good, take care of yourselves – and DON’T LEAVE THE PATH!”2)
they might not have become a tasty meal for giant spiders. Both tales work out well in
the end, but things could so easily have been otherwise had disaster not been averted
in each case by the hero.
45 Para 45, emphasis added.
46 Para 46.
1 Brothers Grimm, The Complete Fairy Tales (Vintage edn, 2007) 125-126 (reported sub nom Little Red
Cap). Not all versions of the story contain the instruction to stay on the path.
2 J R R Tolkien, The Hobbit (Harper Collins edn, 1996; first published 1937) 127.
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A. COWAN v THE HOPETOUN HOUSE PRESERVATION TRUST
Huntsmen and hobbits were, however, conspicuous by their absence when sixty-one-
year-old John Cowan, disregarding an earlier instruction to keep to the paths, took
a shortcut in the dark across the east lawn of Hopetoun House and fell some five
feet into the ditch of the ha-ha.3 Mr Cowan, who was recovering at the time from an
operation for thyroid cancer, incurred a serious fracture to his ankle.
Mr Cowan had taken his five-year-old grandson, Ross, to Hopetoun House for
a guided “bat walk”, an annual event open to the public on payment of a fee. The
walk took a route through rough parts of the grounds which provided habitat for
various breeds of bat. On the night in question the walk commenced in the car park
and finished at the ranger’s centre at the north end of the house, by which time it
was completely dark. Visitors then had to make their own way back from the ranger’s
centre to the car park. HadMr Cowan stuck to the path the accident would never have
happened, but he was on unfamiliar territory, never having visited Hopetoun House
before, and, spotting a set of car headlights off to his right, he became convinced that
the path was taking him in the wrong direction and left it to take what seemed to him
a more direct route across the lawn.
The Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act 1960 imposes a duty on the occupiers
of property to take reasonable care to guard persons entering the premises against
dangers due to the state of the premises or arising from things done on the premises.4
The common law is relevant to liability under the Act in determining the identity of
the occupier, but this was not contentious inCowan. Nevertheless, the action brought
by Mr Cowan was grounded on both the Act and the common law. This should
be unnecessary but the practice, which has attracted criticism in the past,5 clearly
continues.
There was no real scope for arguing that no duty was owed to Mr Cowan by the
proprietors. The case for the defenders rested on the contention that the danger to
which the pursuer fell victim was outwith the scope of their duty and, even if that was
found not to be the case, there had been no breach of duty. The defenders also ran a
plea of contributory negligence.
The contentious issue in Cowan was whether the occupiers’ duty of care extended
to the ha-ha. Normally, there is no duty to protect against obvious and permanent
features of the landscape,6 which is how the ha-ha was described by counsel for
the defenders. Lord Bracadale, however, found the ha-ha to be “an unusual feature
of a concealed nature, particularly in the dark [and] not within the scope of the
authorities as to obvious dangers”.7 The ha-ha was held to be a danger due to the
3 Cowan v The Hopetoun House Preservation Trust [2013] CSOH 9.
4 Section 2(1).
5 See B Gill, “Obligations” in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol 15 (1996) para
318. W J Stewart, “Pleading the Occupiers’ Liability (Scotland) Act and the common law: a solution to a
logical problem” 2007 JR 53.
6 See A McAllister, “Occupiers’ Liability” in J M Thomson (ed), Delict (2007) para 17.36 and cases
discussed therein.
7 Cowan at para 36.
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state of the premises within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, within the scope of
the defenders’ duty. The pursuer’s submission, that the ha-ha presented a reasonably
foreseeable risk of serious injury to unaccompanied and unfamiliar visitors, appears
to have been accepted.
The onus of establishing the standard of care fell, of course, upon the pursuer.
The suggestion offered by counsel, that the ha-ha should have been lit or fenced, was
dismissed as being disproportionate. At the start of the walk Peter Stevens, the ranger
employed by the defenders,8 had advised the visitors to follow him and to stick to the
paths. Counsel contended that this instruction ought to have been repeated at the
end of the walk, and this was accepted. At the end of the walk the ranger had indeed
provided a further briefing without any specific reference to the ha-ha, but which
included instructions on how to return safely to the car park. However, it appears that
Mr Cowan did not hear these instructions as he was taking his grandson to the toilet
at the time. Having rejected the suggestion that the ranger ought to have escorted all
visitors back to the car park, Lord Bracadale stated that the duty would have been
“adequately met by the giving of clear instructions to everyone in the group”.9 He
suggested that Mr Stevens might have led visitors to the front of the main building
and pointed out the safe route before repairing to the ranger’s centre for tea and bat
chat.10 Less had been done than ought reasonably to have been done, accordingly the
defenders were held to be in breach of their duty.
The defender’s plea of contributory negligence was accepted, though the pursuer’s
contribution to his injury was held to be 75% rather than the 80% contended for
by the defenders.11 While there was conflicting evidence, it was established that Mr
Cowan was not paying close enough attention to where he was going, particularly in
view of the fact that he was carrying a relatively powerful torch with new batteries
which he seems not to have used to any effect. Perhaps he was gazing upwards in the
hope of sighting more bats.
B. ANALYSIS
Neither the finding that the defender’s employee took less than reasonable care
to protect the visitors from danger, nor the finding on contributory negligence is
especially remarkable. The critical point of the case is that the ha-ha was found to be
a danger due to the state of the premises and thus within the scope of the occupiers’
duty. There is considerable case law on obvious dangers, old authorities still being
relevant,12 but the law has been reviewed relatively recently in the Inner House13
and Lord Bracadale found sufficient statements of the law in modern reports. It is
8 Not strictly “lone” as he was assisted by Mrs Carol Terry, a nurse and member of the local “bat group”,
whose evidence was judged not entirely reliable.
9 Cowan at para 38.
10 Ibid.
11 Para 39.
12 Stevenson v Glasgow Corporation 1908 SC 1034 and Taylor v Glasgow Corporation 1922 SC (HL) 1
were cited by the defenders in Cowan at para 29.
13 Fegan v Highland Council 2007 SC 723.
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apparent that determination of this issue is not to be reduced purely to the question
of whether or not the danger is obvious.
Fegan v Highland Council14 was a case brought by a woman who had fallen over
a cliff at Thurso. The defenders were granted decree of absolvitor following a proof
before answer. The pursuer’s appeal was dismissed in the Inner House, the opinion
of the Court being delivered by Lord Johnston, who stated:15
In general terms an occupier of land containing natural phenomena such as rivers or
cliffs, which present obvious dangers, is not required to take precautions against persons
becoming injured by reason of those dangers unless there are special risks such as unusual
or unseen sources of danger.
While this makes clear that the normal rule may be subject to qualification, the source
of danger in Cowan was not a natural, but an artificial i.e. man-made, feature and so
it was found helpful to turn also to Graham v East of Scotland Water Authority,16 an
action brought in the Outer House by the widow of a farmer who had drowned in
Glencorse reservoir. In Graham Lord Emslie stated:17
I agree. . . that the abstract concept of “obviousness” is not per se a satisfactory test in this
area of the law. It is, however, relevant to note that in the earlier authorities that term has
generally been used to denote features of the environment which are permanent, ordinary
and familiar. Natural landscape features plainly fall into that category, and in my opinion the
same applies to long standing artificial features which are neither concealed nor unusual,
nor involve exposure to any special or unfamiliar hazard.
If this is a sound statement of the law it may well prove inadequate to describe
a danger as obvious or not without addressing the specific elements listed in
elaboration. In Cowan counsel for the defender attempted to cover all bases, arguing
that:18
there was nothing special, hidden or unusual about the ha-ha. . . a historical and permanent
feature of the grounds which had been there for around 300 years. . . a feature that existed
in many estates and gardens throughout the country. . . an obvious feature which was clearly
visible on approach to the house, certainly during daylight.
This submission could scarcely have been better stated. Its failure was attributable
in no small measure to the nature of a ha-ha itself. Concealment is of the essence
of a ha-ha. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary suggests that the term ha-ha may
originate from “the cry of surprise on discovering the obstacle”. It is designed to
provide a border to a lawn without interfering with or distracting from the vistas
enjoyed from the house, and it was from the house, and in the dark, that Mr Cowan
made his approach.
14 2007 SC 723.
15 At 729.
16 2002 Rep LR 58.
17 At 61.
18 Cowan at para 30.
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While in Graham it was suggested that a history of accidents or complaints might
bring a danger that does not appear unusual, unseen, unfamiliar or otherwise special
within the scope of the duty,19 Lord Bracadale held in Cowan that an absence of
previous accidents or complaints was not a consideration that could be given much
weight.20 Notwithstanding the alleged presence of ha-has in country houses,21 Lord
Bracadale was firmly of the view that this was “an unusual feature about which
someone crossing in the dark would be likely to be unaware”.22 He also considered
the annual bat walk itself to be an unusual event, because visitors were not normally
brought onto the property after dark. In short, a clean record gained in normal
circumstances will not be decisive when circumstances change significantly.
Lord Bracadale described the case as being fact specific.23 This appears to be
an inherent feature of occupiers’ liability and Cowan serves as a useful reminder
that the question of what care is reasonable “always relates to the particular person
in the case”.24 It follows that the circumstances under which a person comes onto
the property continue to be factually relevant notwithstanding the abolition of the
rigid categories of invitee, licensee and trespasser.25 Whether that relevance is truly
restricted to the factual question of reasonable care or intrudes into the issue of duty
may provide scope for further discussion. If there is any merit in the contention of
counsel for the pursuer in Graham that “the ambit of an occupier’s duty required
to be considered afresh in the circumstances of each particular case”,26 then, in the
context of obvious dangers at least, some conceptual overlap may be found between
the existence of the duty and its breach.
Gordon Cameron
University of Dundee
EdinLR Vol 17 pp 398-405
The Agent’s Warranty of Authority: Thus Far
but No Further
As a general rule, an unauthorised agent is unable to create binding legal relations
between his principal and a third party. The third party who is unaware that the agent
lacks authority suffers disappointed expectations, since the anticipated contract with
19 Graham at 61 per Lord Emslie.
20 Cowan at para 36.
21 It is understood that ha-has feature in John Buchan’s Huntingtower and possibly also in George Eliot’s
Middlemarch, though the author does not claim to have read either.
22 Cowan at para 36.
23 Para 38.
24 Gill (n 5) para 325 with reference to s 2(1) of the Act: “[b]ecause the duty to the person in the 1960 Act
is to show reasonable care ‘that that person will not suffer injury or damage”’ (emphasis added).
25 Ibid. See also DMWalker, The Law of Delict in Scotland, 2nd edn (1981) 581 and 585.
26 Graham at 60.
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the principal does not materialise, and is protected in different ways. The principal
may choose to ratify the transaction, in which case it becomes binding on both parties
from the moment the agent purported to enter into it on the principal’s behalf. The
principal who does not wish to ratify may nevertheless have created the impression
that the agent was authorised, potentially resulting in apparent authority. This legal
concept operates to prevent the principal from acting in an inconsistent way by
creating then denying the appearance of authority and if the third party raises an
action against the principal, the latter is barred from denying that the agent was
authorised. Both ratification and apparent authority focus on the relationship between
principal and third party. However, the third party also has a valid action against an
agent who has misrepresented the existence or extent of his authority, namely the
action for breach of warranty of authority. There is very little Scottish case law on this
action, and so the recent Inner House joined cases, Cheshire Mortgage Corporation
Limited v Grandison and Blemain Finance Limited v Balfour Manson LLP,1 provide
a welcome analysis of the legal principles.
A. NATURE OF THE WARRANTY
An agent provides an implied warranty to third parties that he is authorised by his
principal. If that warranty proves to be incorrect, provided the third party relied on
the warranty and has suffered a loss, the agent may be liable in damages to the third
party.
The action is an unusual one and appears not to be a native Scottish concept,
having simply been adopted into Scots from English law. It is based on an implied
contract and as such imposes strict liability on the agent, with the result that even
the agent who honestly believes he is authorised will be liable to the third party in
damages if such a belief was incorrect.
In these joined cases the attempt to extend the ambit of the warranty of authority
was unsuccessful. Lord Clarke, delivering the Inner House decision, stated:2
We are of the clear view that there are no reasons in principle or practice, for extending the
somewhat limited scope and nature of the implied warranty of agents in the way in which
the reclaimers’ submissions in the present case contended for.
B. THE FRAUDULENT SCHEMES
These cases arose as a result of fraudulent schemes, the nature of which can be
illustrated by reference to the facts in Cheshire. A man and a woman approached
lenders purporting to be real individuals, the aptly-named Mr and Mrs Cheetham of
34 Danube Street, Edinburgh. The couple requested a loan which was to be secured
over the property in Danube Street. The fraud was very convincing as the fraudsters
possessed a number of documents including drivers’ licences and utility bills. On the
1 [2012] CSIH 66, [2013] PNLR 3.
2 [2012] CSIH 66 at para 31.
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day the offer letter was issued, they consulted a solicitor, instructing him to act on
their behalf. They explained that the title deeds had been lost and extract registered
title deeds were produced. The solicitor acted only for the borrowers (and not also
the lenders) in procuring the loan from the lenders. Once the loan had been obtained
the fraudsters disappeared leaving the lenders with a standard security which, having
been granted by a non-owner, was ineffective.
The lenders chose to sue the solicitors acting for the fraudsters on the basis of
warranty of authority. It is well established that a solicitor acting as an agent warrants
to the party his client is transacting with (on these facts, the lenders) that he was
authorised. But does the solicitor further warrant that his client is who he claims to
be? This is the essential question raised by the joined cases, namely, as is so often
the case in agency, which of two innocent parties should bear the loss caused by
fraudulent actions.
C. OUTER HOUSE DECISION3
In the Outer House Lord Glennie rejected the lenders’ submissions:4
. . . it is, in my opinion, difficult to see any room for any implied representation by the
solicitors as to the identity of the borrowers for whom they were acting, other than that
they were acting for the people with whom the lenders were already engaged in a process
of finalising a loan transaction. Borrowing from Willes J’s formulation of the warranty in
Collen v Wright [1857 8 E & B 647], the solicitors here in each case did not (sic) more than
warrant “that the authority which (they professed) to have, did in point of fact exist.”
It was clearly relevant to Lord Glennie that the borrowers approached the lenders
directly, and were not introduced by the solicitors.
Lord Glennie also shed light on the legal basis of the action. Drawing on the
judgment of Buxton LJ in SEB Trygg Liv Holding AB v Manches5 he noted that
it is based on an implied collateral contract existing between agent and third party.
This is, of course, a legal fiction: there is no such contract. The contractual analysis
causes difficulties in English law because of the requirement of consideration since
the third party who benefits from the warranty seems to “get something for nothing”.
Consideration is, however, found in the act of the third party in entering into the
contract with the principal. Although Lord Glennie recognised that consideration is
not a requirement in Scots law, he nevertheless felt that it served a useful function:6
. . . the acts which amount to consideration may also indicate the acceptance necessary to
turn the representation or unilateral promise by the agent into a contract between the agent
and third party collateral to that purportedly entered into between the third party and the
agent’s professed principal.
His reference to a unilateral promise is interesting and is revisited below.
3 Cheshire Mortgage Corporation Limited v Grandison [2011] CSOH 157, 2012 SLT 672.
4 [2011] CSOH 157 at para 64.
5 [2006] 1 WLR 2276 at para 60.
6 [2011] CSOH 157 at para 56.
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To Lord Glennie, outcomes are highly dependent on the facts:7
. . . one cannot simply assume the existence of a warranty of authority in all cases. It is
necessary in each case to look at the relationship between the parties, and to examine closely
what was said, expressly or impliedly, by the agent in the context of that relationship, how
what was said could reasonably have been understood by the other party (the test, as always
in contract, being objective.)
This provides a reminder that the warranty is an implied one, shaped by the nature of
the legal relationship between agent and third party. An express warranty is possible,
if unlikely.
Quoting the decision of Lord Drummond Young in a recent case concerning a
similar type of fraud, Lord Glennie confirmed the limited scope of the warranty:8
Thus the representation relates to the person for whom the supposed agent purports to act.
It does not relate to the capacity in which that person, the supposed principal, will enter
into the transaction, or as to the property that person holds, or as to that person’s title to
property.
Finally, he confirmed that liability is strict: it makes no difference to the agent’s
liability that he honestly believed himself to be authorised.9
Returning to the facts, Lord Glennie sought to establish whether the warranty
in this case could extend to the principal’s identity. He emphasised the high degree
of contact between the mortgage company and the fraudsters before the solicitor
became involved:10
Of particular importance, to my mind, is the fact that, by the time the borrowers’ solicitors
became involved, the lenders knew who they were (or thought they were) dealing with.
They had made the decision in principle to lend to those individuals.
Lord Glennie’s decision illustrates the fact that the third party must be induced by
the agent to enter into a contract with the principal: if the third party knows that the
agent is not authorised, there can be no action for breach of warranty.
Although the researches of counsel could find no reported Scottish case in
which an agent had actually been held liable for breach of warranty of authority,
judicial analysis nevertheless exists in cases such as Anderson v Croall,11 Rederi
Aktiebolaget Nordstjernan v Christian Salvesan & Co,12 Irving v Burns,13 and Scott
v JB Livingstone & Nicol.14
7 Ibid.
8 Para 57, quoting from Frank Houlgate Investment Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie LLP [2009] CSOH 165, 2010
SLT 527 at para 27.
9 Para 58.
10 Para 63.
11 (1903) 6 F 153.
12 (1903) 6 F 64.
13 1915 SC 260.
14 1990 SLT 305. To these could be added Royal Bank of Scotland v Skinner 1931 SLT 382, in which Lord
MacKay confirmed the requirement of reliance on the warranty.
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D. INNER HOUSE DECISION15
The Inner House decision begins with the statement of principle from Willes J in
Collen v Wright:16
I am of opinion that a person, who induces another to contract with him as the agent of
a third party by an unqualified assertion of his being authorised to act as such agent, is
answerable to the person who so contracts for any damages which he may sustain by reason
of the assertion of authority being untrue. . . The fact that the professed agent honestly
thinks that he has authority affects the moral character of his act; but his moral innocence,
so far as the person whom he has induced to contract is concerned, in no way aids such
person or alleviates the inconvenience and damage which he sustains. The obligation arising
in such a case is well expressed by saying that a person, professing to contract as agent
for another, impliedly, if not expressly, undertakes to or promises the person who enters
into such a contract, upon the faith of the professed agent being duly authorised, that the
authority which he professes to have does in point of fact exist. The fact of entering into the
transaction with the professed agent, as such, is good consideration for the promise.
Lord Clarke characterised this statement as the simple process of implying a term
into mercantile transactions, drawing an analogy with the implied terms in the Sale of
Goods Act 1979 and the Bills of Exchange Act 1882.
He noted that this action had been received into Scots law from English law,
making reference to a statement of the law contained in Gloag and Henderson, The
Law of Scotland.17 He also referred to Irving v Burns18 both to illustrate the fact that
the third party must actually suffer a loss and to emphasise the limited nature of the
warranty. If the contract with the principal would have been a losing one anyway, for
example because the principal was insolvent, the agent has not caused a loss and will
not therefore be liable in damages.
Given that this is an English concept, reference was made to the leading English
text, which states:19
The basic warranty is only that the agent has authority from his principal: this is something
particularly within the agent’s knowledge. If the principal proves unreliable, that is
something in respect of which the third party could have made inquiries. Merely as agent,
therefore, the agent does not warrant that his principal is solvent, or will perform the
contract (if any). As can be seen below, in the context of litigation, the warranty is similarly
limited in that the agent (normally a solicitor) does not promise that a claim is valid.
Lord Clarke noted (as Lord Glennie had done in the Outer House) the classification
in English law as a collateral contract and the requirement of consideration.20 Excel
15 [2012] CSIH 66, [2013] PNLR 3.
16 1857 8 E & B 647 at 657.
17 Lord Coulsfield and H LMacQueen,Gloag and Henderson: The Law of Scotland, 12th edn (2007) para
19.26, contributed by Lord Coulsfield.
18 1915 SC 260.
19 P G Watts and F M B Reynolds, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency, 19th edn (2010) art 105.
20 [2012] CSIH 66 at para 26.
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Securities Ltd v Masood,21 a case involving a similar identity fraud, was described by
the court as being “good law for Scotland”.22 Lord Clarke quoted from the opinion of
Judge Hegarty in that case:23
An agent acting on behalf of an unidentified principal will not normally incur any personal,
contractual liability so long as he acts within the scope of his authority. Anyone contracting
with such an agent must look to the principal for any redress to which he is entitled as a
matter of contract. However, it is now well established that, in such circumstances, the agent
will normally be regarded as giving an implied warranty as to his authority. If, therefore, he
never had authority to act on behalf of the principal or if his authority has terminated or if
he exceeds the scope of his authority, he will be in breach of the implied warranty and will
be liable in damages to any person to whom the warranty was given. In the common case,
where the principal refuses to accept liability, the right of action against the agent for breach
of his warranty will be an effective substitute for the loss of any right of action against the
principal.
Judge Hegarty had noted the decision in Penn v Bristol & West BS and Ors24 and
concluded that, notwithstanding the result, it was not the case that the solicitor always
warranted his client’s identity. The Inner House agreed.25 Lord Clarke concluded as
follows:26
The identity of a person is made up from a bundle of qualifies or attributes. In particular
there is nothing in principle in the law of contract to prevent an agent from guaranteeing to
a third party that he has a principal who is the same person as appears on property registers,
for example, as the owner of a specific property. . . . but, in any event, where, as here, no
such express warranty was asked for, or given, matters must rest on the implied, warranty
of authority to be implied as a matter of law the extent and nature of which was defined
correctly in the Excel case.
E. CONCLUSIONS
In outlining the limitations on this concept, the Inner House provided a reminder of
the policy reasons behind it.27 The agent is in a better position than the third party to
verify whether he is actually authorised. As such, it seems fair to allow the loss to fall
on the agent rather than on the third party, who might find it difficult to establish the
limits of the agent’s authority. On these particular facts, to extend the warranty further
to encompass the client’s identity would be to place on the solicitor a risk which is the
lender’s risk in making a commercial decision to lend.28 It would, in effect, make
the solicitor a type of insurer of the lender’s losses. Given the forceful terms of Lord
21 [2010] Lloyds Rep PN 165.
22 [2012] CSIH 66 at para 28.
23 Para 29.
24 [1997] 1 WLR 1356.
25 [2012] CSIH 66 at para 29.
26 Para 30.
27 Para 29.
28 As explained in Excel Securities Ltd v Mahood [2010] Lloyds Rep PN 165 at para 102.
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Clarke’s judgment, future attempts to extend the warranty in other ways are equally
unlikely to be successful.
Whilst the restatement of the limitations is welcome, these joined cases highlight
the unusual nature of the warranty. The imposition of strict liability on the agent,
although the natural result of basing the action in contract, is harsh. A contractual
legal basis seems to have arisen through historical accident rather than any deliberate
choice: the action was developed before the rise of negligence in delict. Following
Hedley Byrne v Heller,29 a third party could choose to raise an action against the
agent for misrepresentation in delict. Unsurprisingly, there are few examples of third
parties choosing this path. The contractual action, which compensates the third party
for his disappointed expectations, is likely to result in a higher award of damages
than would be the case were the agent to choose the delictual route. However, if
the agent fraudulently misrepresented the extent of his authority, higher damages
would be available in delict. The contractual legal basis is now firmly embedded in
the law.
The existence of the contractual legal basis is all the more unfortunate bearing in
mind that the contract is a legal fiction. In English law it is based on an implied
collateral contract, consideration being provided when the third party enters into
a contract with the principal in exchange for the agent’s promise. The contract is
unilateral in nature. Scots law has simply adopted this action fromEnglish law without
pausing to ask whether a neater legal basis in Scots law would have been the unilateral
promise.30 The agent can be characterised as promising to the third party that he
is authorised. When this promise is breached, the third party has an action against
the agent for damages. Promise more accurately reflects the one-sided nature of the
dealings between agent and third party, for the third party bears no obligation towards
the agent. Neither legal team in the joined cases appears to have raised promise as
a possible legal basis in the Inner House, despite Lord Glennie’s brief reference to
promise in the Outer House, as noted above.
Given the English attitude towards privity of contract, promise cannot be used as
a legal basis in English law. This explains the choice of the collateral contract, and
the search for consideration. It is unsatisfactory that Scots law has simply adopted
a solution which is framed by the presence of consideration in English law. The
Inner House having confirmed the nature of the action, it now seems unlikely that
promise could be considered as an alternative legal basis. This, in turn, is indicative of
a wider problem, namely the failure to take account of promise as a possible solution
in commercial situations. It is a flexible and useful part of Scots law, particularly
bearing in mind that, in a commercial context, it need not be in writing.31 Complex
commercial contexts often involve the interaction of numerous commercial actors and
29 [1964] AC 465.
30 The current author originally made this suggestion in “Unauthorised agency in Scots Law”, in D Busch
and L Macgregor (eds), The Unauthorised Agent: Perspectives From European and Comparative Law
(2009) 261 at 291-296.
31 Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 s 1(2)(a)(ii).
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the ability to recognise binding unilateral legal commitments is a facet of the Scottish
system which is unfortunately often ignored.
These are criticisms which relate to the structural nature of the action. It would,
of course, be unreasonable to expect the court completely to reshape the remedy in
the context of litigation. More radical change would only be possible if the issue were
considered by the Scottish Law Commission. In the meantime, we should welcome
the Inner House’s refusal to extend an already anomalous concept in a way which
would have been practically unworkable for the solicitors’ profession as a whole.
Laura Macgregor
University of Edinburgh
EdinLR Vol 17 pp 405-410
Unjustified Enrichment Claims: When Does the
Prescriptive Clock Begin to Run?
Two recent judgments of the Outer House of the Court of Session have considered
the question of when prescription starts to run in relation to an unjustified enrichment
claim. Unfortunately both judgments contain, it is respectfully submitted, errors
of analysis which suggest that the Scottish courts are not yet fully at ease with
the reformed law of unjustified enrichment developed in the so-called “enrichment
revolution” of the late 1990s. The present author has recently called, in discussing
another unjustified enrichment decision, for further development of the law by the
Inner House.1 The cases discussed below add further weight to this call.
Claims in unjustified enrichment are based upon a cause of action which rests,
in broad terms, on the principle that no-one should be unjustifiably enriched at the
expense of another.2 This principle may be broken down into several elements which
must be present before a claim in unjustified enrichment arises: (1) a gain made by
the defender, (2) at the expense of the pursuer, (3) which is unjustifiably retained by
the defender. One might also add a fourth requirement, that no relevant defence is
available to the defender, but this final consideration is not of primary importance in
calculating when prescription runs in enrichment claims. For that calculation, what is
crucial is the moment when the defender unjustifiably retains an enrichment at the
pursuer’s expense. It is that concurrence of the specified elements (1) to (3) above
that constitutes “the date when the obligation became enforceable”, which is the time
specified in section 6(3) of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 as the
moment from which the five year prescriptive period applicable to obligations arising
from unjustified enrichment begins to run.
1 See M Hogg, “Continued uncertainty in the analysis of unjustified enrichment” 2013 SLT (News) 111.
2 Morgan Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Lothian Regional Council 1995 SC 151 at 155 per Lord
President Hope.
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A. VIRDEE v STEWART
This first of the two recent cases, Virdee v Stewart,3 concerned a family dispute over
improvements made to land. The land in question was owned by the defender (who
was the brother of the pursuer), the pursuer having built a croft on it in the early
1990s, with the defender’s permission, with the intention that she and her family
would be able to stay in the croft as and when she wished. The defender allowed them
to do so for a number of years. The pursuer also occasionally let the croft out, keeping
the income derived from such lettings. In 2009 her relationship with her brother
broke down, at which point he took possession of the croft. The pursuer knew that she
did not own the land on which the croft was built. She did not aver any belief that by
building on the land she would acquire any legally enforceable interest in it, nor that
she had entered into any contract with the defender regarding her use of the croft or
the acquisition of any interest in it. The pursuer raised an action against the defender
claiming recompense in the amount of £170,000 in respect of the defender’s having
been unjustifiably enriched by retaining the benefit of the croft built on his land. The
defender argued that the pursuer’s claim had prescribed, prescription having begun to
run on any such claim by August 1994 at the latest, well after the five year prescriptive
period specified under the 1973 Act.
Having reviewed the standard modern authorities on unjustified enrichment, Lady
Smith concluded that:4
. . . it is clear that, as a matter of law, the defender was enriched as soon as the house was
completed - at that point it can readily be inferred that the value of that part of the land
on which his house was built would have been significantly enhanced. Further, that was an
enrichment which, again, as a matter of law, was wholly unjustified because he had no legal
right or entitlement to it.
Lady Smith expressed the view that, contrary to what had been suggested in some
of the pursuer’s pleadings, this was not a case of the condictio causa data causa non
secuta, there being no future cause for which the pursuer had made any transfers
to the defender. That being so, the only point at which the defender gained an
unjustified enrichment was when the construction of the croft was completed in 1994.
Any claim which she might, therefore, have against him in unjustified enrichment had
prescribed in 1999 and on this basis she dismissed the claim.
There is, however, some difficulty with Lady Smith’s analysis of the case. Most
cases of unjustified enrichment through improvement of another’s property concern
circumstances where the improver mistakenly, but bona fide, believes the property
to be his own. However, this was a case where the improver knew that the land was
not hers and knew, therefore, that by improving it she was conferring an enrichment
which would accrue to another party. If any claim in unjustified enrichment which she
might have was not therefore classifiable as the improvement of land in the bona fide
but mistaken view that it was the pursuer’s, it logically must be classified in some other
3 [2011] CSOH 50.
4 Para 24.
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way. Lady Smith does not seek to classify the claim (save to reject it as an instance of
the condictio causa data causa non secuta), but the obvious alternative classification
is as an instance of the condictio ob causam finitam, that being a claim in respect of an
enrichment conferred for the continuation of a cause which subsequently ceases to
operate. The continuing cause in this case could be said to be the defender’s ongoing
permission to the pursuer and her family to occupy the croft, a cause that ceased
in 2009 when the parties’ relationship broke down. It was at that point (and not the
date construction of the croft was completed) that the defender’s enrichment became
unjustified, and it was at that point – in 2009, not 1994 – that a claim in unjustified
enrichment became available to the pursuer.
This analysis is consistent with what was said by Lord President Hope about the
prescription of a recompense claim inNVDevos Gebroeder v Sunderland Sportswear
Ltd,5 namely that the claim for recompense “came into existence when all the facts
necessary to establish it had occurred, and from that moment the pursuers were in a
position to make a relevant claim for recompense based on those facts”.6 Assuming
that the characterisation of the claim as the condictio ob causam finitam is correct,
it was necessary for the fact of the pursuer’s exclusion from the property to come
into existence before the claim of recompense could arise. The mere enrichment
of the defender in 1994 was not sufficient. In response to the question, “could the
pursuer have sued the defender in recompense in 1994?”, the answer must surely
be no because the defender could have answered, “I am not unjustifiably enriched,
as I am quite willing to permit the cause for which the enrichment was given to
me – namely, giving permission for the pursuer and her family to occupy the croft – to
continue. I may thus be enriched, but my enrichment is not unjustified.” While Lady
Smith correctly noted the time of enrichment, she did not do so in respect of the time
at which the enrichment became unjustified.
This analysis suggests that Lady Smith ought not to have held that prescription
extinguished the pursuer’s claim in 1999. On the contrary, the five year prescriptive
period did not begin to run until 2009, meaning that a claim raised in 2010 was
well within the prescriptive period. The approach taken in Virdee was misguided,
the mistake arising from a failure to categorise the precise nature of the pursuer’s
claim. Had it been correctly categorised as the condictio ob causam finitam, the
court’s attention would have been drawn to the proper focus of the enquiry, namely
the point at which the defender’s justification for retaining the enrichment (the causa
of his enrichment) ceased to operate. It was not until the pursuer was excluded from
the croft that he was unjustifiably enriched.
B. THOMSON v MOONEY
The error made in Virdee was repeated in Thomson v Mooney.7 In this case, the
parties began to cohabit in 2005. Having become engaged to be married, in June
5 1990 SC 291.
6 At 301.
7 [2012] CSOH 177.
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2005 they purchased a house in Airdrie for £180,000, each of them taking a one
half pro indiviso share in the subjects. The pursuer contributed £70,000 from his
own funds to the purchase price, the remainder being raised through a loan from
Bristol and West plc. The relationship failed and the parties ceased to cohabit in
September 2007. The pursuer stopped paying instalments on the loan in October
2007 and the house was sold in December for £160,000. The proceeds of the
sale were used to repay the loan from Bristol and West, and also to repay a loan
from the Royal Bank of Scotland which the defender had taken out to finance her
business. Following payment of those sums, the net sale proceeds were approximately
£35,806.
The pursuer averred that the sum of £70,000 had been paid by him on the
understanding that the parties would be married and would continue to live together.
He further averred that he paid money into the defender’s business and agreed to be
jointly liable with the defender for a business loan obtained from the Royal Bank of
Scotland in the sum of £106,050. The pursuer therefore claimed that the defender
had been unjustly enriched in two respects:
(1) she had been enriched to the value of £35,000 in respect of the payment of
£70,000 that he made when the house was acquired. Half of the total sum paid
by him amounted to a contribution towards her one half pro indiviso share of the
house; and
(2) she had been further enriched by the pursuer’s contributions to her business in
the sum of £57,178, and by a further sum of £11,256, which was the portion of
the proceeds of sale of the house used towards the repayment of the defender’s
share of a loan for her business.
In consequence, the pursuer claimed payment of two sums (£35,000 and £68,434)
from the defender on the basis of unjustified enrichment in the form of recompense.
The defender counterclaimed for payment of £8,943.25, based on a right of relief.
She further argued that the pursuer’s claim for £35,000 had prescribed by virtue
of section 6 of the 1973 Act, arguing that prescription had begun to run when
she first became enriched, namely in June 2005 (the date when the pursuer had
contributed funds towards the house purchase). By contrast, the pursuer argued
that it was only when the parties separated in September 2007 that her retention of
the enrichment became unjustified, and only then that the prescriptive clock began
to run.
Giving judgment, Lord Drummond Young held in favour of the defender in
respect of the prescription point, but on the other aspects of the claim he ordered
a proof before answer. On the prescription point, it is suggested that his lordship
reached the wrong decision. He founded heavily on the remark of Lord President
Hope in NV Devos Gebroeder v Sunderland Sportswear Ltd quoted above, holding
that what was crucial to the raising of a recompense claim (and hence to the start
of the prescriptive clock) was the concurrence of (i) enrichment on the part of the
defender, and (ii) the lack of a legal ground justifying retention of the benefit. So
far so good: crucial to the raising of an unjustified enrichment claim (specifically, in
this case, one where the remedy of recompense is sought) is both that the defender
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be enriched at the pursuer’s expense and that retention of such enrichment be
without any legal cause. Where Lord Drummond Young fell down, however, was in
relation to the same issue upon which Lady Smith went awry, namely his analysis
of the second element, the point at which retention of the enrichment became
unjustified. He rightly identified the contribution of the pursuer’s £70,000 to the
house purchase as the point when the defender was enriched by a one half share of
that sum (June 2005). But he failed to analyse properly the nature of the pursuer’s
claim as an instance of the condictio causa data causa non secuta (the pursuer
argued that in contributing £70,000 to the house purchase he intended a transfer
to the defender of one half of that £70,000 which was conditional on a future cause,
the parties’ intended marriage).8 While that marriage remained in contemplation,
the defender had a legal ground (or causa) to retain the value transferred to her,
namely the parties’ intended marriage. However, when the relationship ended and
the wedding was called off, the intended marriage failed to materialise and the
defender’s justification for retaining the benefit ceased. While fulfilment of the
condition was in prospect, the defender had a ground to retain the benefit; when the
condition failed, such ground ceased to exist and her retention of the benefit became
unjustified.
However, Lord Drummond Young failed to apply this logic. He argued instead
that when a transfer is made in contemplation of marriage “absence of a legal ground
is present from the outset”.9 This is a remarkable statement, as it effectively holds
that, in the case of a causa data causa non secuta, there is never any valid causa to
begin with and a transferor would be quite entitled to demand the return of the thing
at any time whether or not the event specified as the reason for the transfer occurred.
Lord Drummond Young adds an example to justify this view:10
. . . for example, if a man transferred funds to his fiancée in contemplation of their marriage
but then discovered that he required the money to pay a debt and thus avoid sequestration,
there can be little doubt that he would be entitled to return of the money at once.
Unfortunately, there is more than a serious doubt that this is not the law. In Lord
Drummond Young’s bizarre example the man may get his money back at any point,
even if the marriage is still contemplated; but if that is so, why does the condictio
causa data causa non secuta even exist if one does not need to wait until the causa
8 Lord Drummond Young characterises the pursuer’s claim as an instance of the condictio causa data
causa non secuta, seeing the contemplated marriage as the future causa for which the enrichment was
transferred. Alternatively, it would have been possible to have brought the facts of the case within the
condictio ob causam finitam by characterising the parties’ relationship as a continuing cause which came
to an end. The pursuer’s agent seems to have vacillated between these two possibilities (see para 8).
Either ought properly to have led the court to the conclusion that unjustified retention of the enrichment
did not arise until the parties’ relationship ended (the point, it seems, at which the wedding was called
off).
9 Para 13.
10 Para 13.
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is non secuta before a claim may be made? For good measure, he adds the further
remark that:11
No doubt in some cases of this nature there may be an intention to make a gift, but that
would clearly be inconsistent with obligation to make recompense and the pursuer would
fail on that ground, without regard to prescription.
This also makes little sense: gifts are most certainly not inconsistent with a claim for
recompense, so long as the gift is made conditionally; if it is, then the failure of the
condition gives a perfectly good ground for seeking return of the gift.
Lord Drummond Young sought further support for his position by citing the
judgment in Virdee. Given the criticism that has been levelled at Virdee, its citation
adds nothing useful to his Lordship’s reasoning; on the contrary, citation of Virdee
merely serves to compound the same error made in Virdee and amounts to a
regrettable entrenchment of that approach. Lord Drummond Young ought to have
held that retention of the enrichment only became unjustified when the parties’
contemplated marriage was called off. Only at that point did the causa under which
the transfer was made fail to follow (i.e. was non secuta). That being so, the pursuer’s
claim to the £35,000 ought not to have prescribed.
C. CONCLUSION
These two cases point to a difficulty which courts are experiencing in understanding
the nature of the reasons (the causae) in respect of which enrichments may be
transferred. Such reasons may be conditional, giving rise to cases where a recipient
of an enrichment will originally have an entitlement to retain or make use of an
enrichment, but will cease to be so entitled when a continuing reason for the transfer
ceases (ob causam finitam) or when an expected reason fails to materialise (causa data
causa non secuta). In such cases, it is only when the entitlement ceases that retention
of the enrichment becomes unjustified and prescription begins to run on unjustified
enrichment claims. A failure to appreciate this, and a mistaken finding that unjustified
enrichment claims arise at the very moment of conferral of the enrichment, will
lead (as occurred in the two cases discussed) to incorrect application of the rules
of prescription and injustice to pursuers through denial of perfectly valid claims.
At the first opportunity, the Inner House (or Supreme Court) must take steps to
overrule the prescription aspects of Virdee and Thomson. If such an opportunity also
permits further general development of the law of unjustified enrichment, identified
previously by the present writer as being necessary,12 so much the better. At this
crucial stage in the continuing reform of the law of unjustified enrichment we cannot
afford to allow bad decisions to bed in.
Martin Hogg
University of Edinburgh
11 Para 12.
12 Hogg (n 1).
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A Forgotten Law and Policy Issue as Independence
Looms: Nuclear Waste Management in Scotland
The United Kingdom has a unique constitutional landscape in comparison to any
other nuclear state. Due to devolution within the UK the current pro-nuclear policy
faces a challenge not previously encountered. Competence to legislate in certain areas
is now shared with the Scottish government and regional assemblies in Wales and
Northern Ireland. The issue of nuclear waste management raises particular problems
for Scotland with the vote for Scottish independence looming.
A. FORTHCOMING LEGAL PROBLEMS
The main legal problem is that Scotland, as a devolved power, has no competence
over nuclear energy installations1 yet has full competence in respect to environmental
matters and planning.2 The Scottish parliament has rejected the idea of deep
geological disposal facility (“GDF”)3 and also new nuclear build.4 However, this does
not answer the question of what happens to radioactive waste at Scottish nuclear sites
and also Scottish-produced legacy waste which is stored at Sellafield. The problem has
been exacerbated by the Scottish independence campaign and, as Cameron points
out, “there is therefore a mesh of vertical and horizontal lines of authority that will
impact upon policy implementation”.5
This legal dilemma will be further intensified in an independent Scotland (or in a
Scottish parliament with greater devolved powers) and already politicians have voiced
their concerns, especially regarding the legal position of Scottish higher activity waste
(“HAW”) at Sellafield. This is a key legal problem given that under European Union
law it is ultimately the responsibility of member states to manage spent fuel and
radioactive waste. Moreover, it is possible for two or more member states to agree
to use a common disposal facility under strict conditions.6 Furthermore, European
Union law now obliges member states to develop national programmes for nuclear
waste disposal and to notify them to the European Commission by 2015 at the latest.
These national programmes must include a timetable for the construction of disposal
1 Scotland Act 1998 sch 5 part II D4.
2 Sch 5 part II D4 exceptions (a) and (b).
3 Scottish Government, Scotland’s Higher Activity Radioactive Waste Policy 2011 (2011) 4-5, available at
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/338695/0111419.pdf.
4 Scottish Government, Scottish Energy Policy: An Overview (2008) 7, available at http://www.scotland.
gov.uk/Resource/Doc/237670/0065265.pdf .
5 P D Cameron, “A revival of nuclear power: an analysis of the legal implications” (2007) 19 JEL 71 at 84.
6 Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom OJ L199/48 “establishing a Community framework for the
responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste”. For a brief summary see
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-906_en.htm.
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facilities, as well as a description of the activities needed to implement disposal
solutions, costs assessments and a description of the financing schemes.7 In addition,
every ten years member states are required to invite and conduct international peer
reviews in order to exchange experience and to ensure the application of the highest
standards.
Jamie Reed MP voiced concerns at Westminster as to whether the government
will commit itself to an analysis of the volumes of Scottish HAW which is stored in
England, the costs to remove them, where they will be located in Scotland, and who
will be responsible for them in the long term.8 A Scottish government statement
in reply suggested that proposals for nuclear decommissioning in an independent
Scotland would be covered in a white paper to be published in November 2013.9
What this white paper proposes for the management of the obligations Scotland
may have will be very interesting, especially concerning nuclear waste which has
been removed from Dounreay, Hunterston, Torness and Chapelcross and taken to
Sellafield. This issue is becoming more complex and the timing is open to question
concerning the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’s (“NDA”) plans to make around
fifty rail shipments over the next five years from the Dounreay nuclear site in
Caithness to the Sellafield reprocessing complex in Cumbria.10 These plans, which
involve the transportation by train of forty-four tonnes of radioactive uranium and
plutonium, have met with considerable opposition from local authorities concerned
about accidents and terrorist attacks.11 This in turn provides an insight into future
problems relating to the Scottish nuclear waste dilemma. The five-year timescale
could easily lead to the NDA transporting waste from what could be a foreign country
post-2015.
B. THE PRESSURE OF TIME
If Scotland gains independence from the UK the waste must return to Scotland
where there are neither facilities nor any legal framework in place to deal with the
problem.12 Furthermore, will a new legal framework be needed in which Scottish
taxpayers are liable for their share of the cost of keeping the waste in England?
Considering the fact that the UK has not yet enacted any legislation directly
7 Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom OJ L199/48 ch 2 art 5 (a)-(h).
8 “Nuclear waste Bill threat to Scotland”, Scottish Express, 22 January 2012.
9 “Cumbrian MP says Scotland must take waste back under independence”, News and Star, 18 October
2012.
10 Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, Preferred and Credible Options for DFR Exotic Fuel (2011),
available at http://www.nda.gov.uk/news/dfr-exotic-fuel-options.cfm.
11 “Nuclear train route to Sellafield runs into opposition from local councils”, The Guardian, 26 August
2011.
12 For further detail see the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency website which contains
reports on the issue dating back to 2007, available at http://www.sepa.org.uk/radioactive_
substances/radioactive_waste/higher_activity_waste_guidance.aspx.
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concerning nuclear waste13 the potential problems created by Scottish independence,
or by the more likely outcome of near-complete devolution, are very real.
The UK is advancing its own policy in this area14 but the Scottish government
has yet to engage fully with the issue in the debates surrounding independence.
An independent Scotland would need its own independent nuclear waste storage
facility,15 and by having a lower number of nuclear energy plants it would not benefit
from economies of scale. Moreover, the timescale means that existing Scottish nuclear
power sites will be decommissioned before any robust interim storage facility or GDF
can be built. This has the potential to become a significant legal problem in the near
future.
It is surprising that Scottish policy on this issue has escaped any detailed scrutiny
from either Holyrood or Westminster16 but instead has been characterised by
environmental rhetoric such as the importance of “precautionary” and “proximity”
principles.17 Scotland has firmly rejected the GDF policy and instead seeks long-
term interim storage. However, any mention of intermediate storage in respect of
nuclear power plants is often followed by criticism that intermediate storage is risky
due to natural disasters and terrorism. This argument has been strengthened since
the accident in Fukushima.18
C. LEARNING FROM EUROPE
The Scottish context must be placed within comparative European experiences
of dealing with nuclear waste. In sharp contrast to Scotland, France (alongside
Finland and Sweden) has embraced the idea of GDF for storing nuclear waste.19
A 2006 revision of the French Waste Management Act20 agreed the one-billion-euro
construction of the extensiveMeuse/HauteMarne underground nuclear waste facility
13 It should be noted that the current Managing Radioactive Waste Safely (MRWS) Programme has
ground to a halt following the exit of Cumbria County Council (the only “volunteer” community) from
the process for a variety of reasons. The Council also exercised its legal right to veto the plans which
resulted in an end to the GDF development plans.
14 For further detail on UK policy developments in the area see https://www.gov.uk/government/
policies/managing-the-use-and-disposal-of-radioactive-and-nuclear-substances-and-waste/supporting-
pages/providing-policy-for-the-safe-and-secure-disposal-of-radioactive-waste.
15 Either long-term storage or GDF.
16 Jamie Reed MP has stated (n 9) that he has “been trying to raise this for the best part of two years. I’ve
written to the Prime Minister but he is not interested, I’ve written to the First Minister but I didn’t
even get an acknowledgement of my letter. . . Westminster and Holyrood can’t just pretend there isn’t
happening. It just isn’t right for my constituents to accept the risk and for English taxpayers to pay for
the disposal and storage of nuclear waste from Scotland if it becomes a foreign country.”
17 World Nuclear Association, Fukashima Accident 2011 (2013), available at http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Fukushima-Accident-2011/#.UWXJ_hlRGvM.
18 Ibid. See also T N Srinivasan and T S Gopi Rethinaraj, “Fukishima and thereafter: reassessment of
risks of nuclear power” (2013) 52 Energy Policy 726.
19 French Ministry for Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy, Plan National de Gestion
des Matières et des Déchets Radioactifs 2013-2015 (2013), available at http://www.developpement-
durable.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/13030_PN-dechets-radioactifs-2013_complet_def_light.pdf .
20 Loi n◦ 2006-686 du 13 juin 2006 relative à la transparence et à la sécurité en matière nucléaire.
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near Bure in north east France. This effectively became the home of a new National
Radioactive Waste Management Agency (ANDRA) designed to research the viability
of the site, which is due to receive nuclear waste in 2025. A major shift from a centre-
right to a left-wing government has, at first sight, caused tension in France’s national
commitment to GDF. Nevertheless, in response to President Hollande’s commitment
to reduce dependency on nuclear energy from 75% to 50%, Batho, the centre-left
minister for Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy, commented, “[w]e must
ensure its safe conditions, regardless of our energy mix”.21
The GDF preference should be understood (worryingly for the UK) in light
of controversies in the mass transportation of waste between Germany, France
and the Netherlands. Thousands of protesters have obstructed nuclear waste rail
transportation since the 1990s, and most recently in 2012 and 2013 there have
been seven individual high-profile instances resulting in police arrests.22 Energy
company Areva estimates that 200 such operations take place across Europe
each year, albeit this amounts to only 1% of all dangerous goods transport in
and out of EU member states according to the European Commission.23 The
requirement of member states to develop national disposal plans for the construction
of appropriate facilities (potentially shared, as stated above) certainly does not exclude
transportation concerns.24 European experience would suggest, nevertheless, that
such transportation should be minimised. These cases demonstrate the lengthy
timescale, durable commitment and geographical considerations required for nuclear
waste decisions that have hitherto been absent, or worse ignored, in the Scottish case.
D. CONCLUSION
The UK is currently at an advanced stage of expanding its nuclear energy industry,
yet the problem of nuclear waste disposal remains unresolved. Scotland has taken the
opposite view to the UK both with respect to the future of nuclear power and how to
deal with the waste that Scotland is liable for. In an independent or further devolved
Scotland the task of building the necessary installations for nuclear waste disposal will
be a significant cost to a new nation. However, there is also a lack of a legal framework,
and this should be addressed with immediate effect.
Scotland has certain questions to answer in relation to its energy sector prior to
the vote on independence. These include oil and gas; climate change; and nuclear
waste management. The oil and gas issue is not the focus here, nor is climate change,
but they do have relevance for a discussion of nuclear waste management. Climate
change targets have been missed by Scotland, and although the Scottish government
21 French Ministry for Ecology, Sustainable Development and Energy, Pour un égestion intégrée et
cohérente de l’ensemble des déchets radioactifs. Communiqué de Presse, 25 April 2013.
22 M Gay, Septs Militants Condamnés. L’Est Republicain (2013) 24-26.
23 AREVA, Le Transport des Combustibles Nucléaires Usés, des Déchets Vitrifiés et Compactes (2012)
Rapport XI.
24 See Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom OJ L199/48 “establishing a Community framework for the
responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste”, ch 2 art 5 (a)-(h); also
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-906_en.htm.
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has stated that they are still on track to meet the targets, another issue has not been
addressed.25 Nuclear energy provides between 35% to 45% of Scotland’s electricity
needs. Since nuclear power plants are scheduled to come off line in approximately
fifteen to twenty years time and there are no plans for any new nuclear build in
Scotland, there is a looming threat to the climate change target. To date, the Scottish
government has not addressed the question of how nuclear energy as an electricity
provider will be replaced.
The nuclear waste management issue and the nuclear energy area in general
are open to further research and debate in Scotland particularly due to the fact
that the UK legal framework in relation to nuclear waste management remains
unresolved. The legitimacy deficit that has been created, as well as the loss of trust
in stakeholders, will have to be repaired in order to deliver successfully a UK nuclear
waste disposal policy. For Scotland, a clear agenda needs to be established and a new
legal framework developed prior to the independence referendum. Considering the
short timeframe involved, the opportunity to agree on new policy and legislation is of
grave concern.
Raphael J Heffron, Michael Allen and Darren McCauley
University of Stirling
University of St. Andrews
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High Hedges and Neighbours
Whilst Scotland cannot lay claim to many entries within the “tallest/largest” category
much beloved by readers of The Guinness Book of Records, it does have at least
one: that of being home to the tallest and longest hedge in the world, namely the
Meikleour Hedge in Perth and Kinross, which extends to one hundred feet in height
and nearly one third of a mile in length. Thought to have been planted shortly before
the Battle of Culloden, such is its scale that trimming it is a six week task undertaken
once a decade by a team of four men. It is a thing of beauty to behold.
However, for the unfortunate few, having a high hedge in proximity to their home
is far from aesthetically pleasing and the blocking of light to neighbouring homes
caused by towering hedges has become a favourite topic for the press. Growth in
urban density of the population coupled with shrinkage in size of the average modern
house has led to the planting of many fast-growing hedges in order to protect privacy.
Once planted, these hedges which can often grow at a rate of three to four feet per
25 For further detail see Scottish Parliament News Release, “Climate change plan must improve if
Scotland is to meet its targets finds Rural Affairs, Climate Change and Environment Committee”,
22 March 2013, available at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/newsandmediacentre/61441.aspx and
“Scottish targets for climate change missed”, BBC News Online, 7 June 2013.
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annum, can be neglected by their owners (and their successors in turn) and operate
as a trigger for potential disputes as well as detracting from the visual amenity once
enjoyed by a property.
A. BACKGROUND
In Scotland hedges have had the capacity to be used as weapons to block out light
in highly polarised neighbour disputes. No planning permission is required to plant
one and there are no restrictions as to the height of their growth. Affected parties
appear not to have attempted thus far to apply the common law of nuisance nor
one of the statutory nuisance definitions under section 79(1)(a) of the Environmental
Protection (Scotland) Act 1990, as amended by the Public Health (Scotland) Act
2008, of a high hedge simply being regarded as “a nuisance” per se to counter
what, in many cases, could be regarded as an intolerable interference in the use
or enjoyment of their property. Lawyers appear reluctant to use nuisance as a
basis for actions of interdict and specific implement. High hedges can have an
adverse effect on the architectural relationship between buildings by virtue of their
sheer disproportionality, thus potentially also having a detrimental effect on the
marketability and saleability of affected adjacent properties. A towering high hedge
near a property being marketed for sale could be construed as a potential marker
of bad neighbours by prospective viewers. Whilst many surveyors would be loath
to support this view directly in the absence of comparable data based on sales
of identical properties within the same area, one being affected by a proximate
high hedge and the other not, it is surely arguable that this would deter potential
buyers.
However, the potential for high hedges to act both as the root cause of a neighbour
dispute or as further ammunition in the same context is about to change by virtue of
the High Hedges (Scotland) Act 2013, which received Royal Assent on 2 May 2013
and is anticipated will be brought into force in early 2014. The Act, which campaign
groups such as Scothedge have sought for many years, was first proposed as a private
member’s Bill in 2002 and legislation with broadly comparable aims was introduced
in England and Wales in 2003,1 in the Isle of Man in 2005 (where it extends to single
trees),2 and most recently in Northern Ireland in 2011.3
The statute will give to local authorities powers to settle high hedge disputes
between neighbours which have reached an impasse or, indeed, in situations where
one party simply refuses to engage in any meaningful discussion regarding the
possible impact that the height of his hedge is having on the quality of living
of the affected party. Respondents in the consultation process in Scotland were
overwhelmingly in favour of high hedge disputes being decided by a local authority,
as opposed to through the courts, in light of the positive experience of this approach
1 Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 Part 8.
2 Trees and High Hedges Act 2005.
3 High Hedges Act (Northern Ireland) 2011.
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being adopted in England and Wales and perceived benefits in both speed and cost.4
Section 2(1) of the Act provides for applications to be made to a council by an owner
or occupier where they consider that a high hedge on neighbouring land is having a
detrimental effect on the reasonable enjoyment of their domestic property. The new
legislation does not extend to commercial properties and land does not necessarily
need to share a boundary with the property affected by the hedge to fall within the
ambit of the dispute which the local authority will determine.
B. HIGH HEDGES
Whilst the genesis of the statute was well publicised, namely neighbour issues with
fast-growing and robust Leylandii trees, the ultimate definition of what constitutes
a hedge was extended to include deciduous trees as well as beech hedges, although
single trees do not fall within the scope of the Act. The intent of the legislation is
to provide a mechanism for dispute resolution, as opposed to a narrow focus on the
horticultural side of what may or may not constitute a high hedge, and it reserves
extremely wide powers for the Scottish Ministers to vary the meaning of a high hedge
and to “make different provision for different cases” to this end. A high hedge is
defined within section 1 of the statute and is stated to be a hedge which is formed
wholly or mainly by a row of two or more trees or shrubs which forms a barrier to
light and rises to a height of more than two metres above ground level. In measuring
the height, roots of any hedge are disregarded and a hedge will not be regarded as
forming a barrier to light if it has gaps which significantly reduce its overall effect as
a barrier to light at heights of more than two metres.
The impact of high hedges on properties is limited strictly by the statute to
consideration of any diminishing effect upon light enjoyed by the neighbouring
property and does not extend to any effect upon views, nor does it operate as a
mechanism for complaints about the roots of any hedges which may result in the
blocking of drains. The word “reasonably”, as one might anticipate in legislation
intended to assist with neighbour dispute impasses, features consistently throughout
the Act and the relevant local authority will be required to interpret reasonableness
upon receipt of a suitable application from an affected party, presumably taking into
account traditional nuisance factors such as the character of the neighbourhood,
convention and the impact upon the affected person. Each application will be
considered on its own merits and, as such, the standard will be difficult to define
precisely. Applications must be accompanied by the appropriate fee, the amount of
which has yet to be determined, but is expected to be somewhere in the region of
£325 to £500.
Key among the provisions, however, is the necessity under section 3(1) of the
statute for the applicant to have taken “all reasonable steps to resolve the matters
in relation to the high hedge” before making any application to the local authority.
Applicants must first consider whether they have met the guidance to be issued in
4 Scottish Government, Consultation on High Hedges: An Analysis of Responses (2010), available at
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2010/03/25102917/0.
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due course by individual local authorities as to these steps. In looking to comparable
guidance notes issued by English councils, it is thought likely that a local authority
might stipulate that an applicant must have attempted to resolve matters by means
of community mediation, which is often available at no cost in situations where an
impasse has been reached or where communication has broken down. If parties are
receptive to mediation this approach may prove effective, as often so-called “hedge
rage” can be a culmination of incremental neighbour disputes and may be indicative
of a wider problem which might readily be addressed by dialogue facilitated by a
trained mediator even in cases where it appears that a deadlock has been reached. In
light of the requirement to have taken all reasonable steps, it would appear prudent
for prospective applicants to keep a chronology of sorts of their attempts to resolve
the dispute as well as evidence of this where possible, for instance, copy letters. If
the applicant has not demonstrably met the criteria under section 3(1) there is a risk
that the application will be dismissed. The local authority similarly has powers under
section 5 to reject any application which is thought to be “frivolous or vexatious”. A
potential example of a dismissal-worthy application may be where someone applies
repeatedly to obtain a notice although the physical nature of the contended hedge has
not changed. Such provisions evidence the legislators’ consciousness that neighbour
law itself can operate as potential ammunition in long- entrenched battles between
feuding neighbours.
The relevant local authority must give every owner and occupier of the land where
the hedge is growing a copy of the application and the owner or occupier subsequently
has twenty-eight days to make any representations which are, in turn, copied to the
applicant. Once the period has expired, it falls to the local authority to determine
the outcome and in reaching a decision it has a statutory duty to consider whether
the high hedge in question is of historical or cultural significance. Whilst the Act itself
does not state that any biodiversity value be taken into account, a local authority would
need to observe the general duty to consider this factor under section 1 of the Nature
Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004.
Any high hedge notice issued will stipulate the action deemed necessary to remedy
the adverse effect created by the hedge, or to prevent the recurrence of the adverse
effect, or both, and will advise the owner of the land where the hedge is sited that
there is a right of appeal under section 12 of the statute. A notice is binding upon
every person who is the owner of the land specified but it is not possible to register
or record the notice in the Land Register nor in the General Register of Sasines.
The relevant local authority has the powers to enforce compliance with the action
prescribed in the notice and entry to the land on which the hedge is planted can be
authorised by a sheriff or justice of the peace on application. Where it is necessary
to enforce compliance, expenses (which can comprise those for remedial action, or
administrative costs plus interest thereon) are thereafter recoverable from the owner
with accompanying powers for the council to register a notice of liability for these
within the relevant property register. The right of appeal for both an affected party
and the hedge owner lies to the Scottish ministers who, in turn, may appoint a person
for that decision-making purpose. In England and Wales the planning inspectorate
carries out this role.
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C. IMPACT
Looking to the English and Welsh experience to gauge the likely volume of
applications under the new Act, only a small proportion of the large number of
initial enquiries from affected parties became formal applications to be considered
by councils, and the number has remained in the region of 400 per annum since the
legislation was introduced.5 Mere awareness through the media of the impending
powers to be assumed by local authorities had the effect of encouraging high hedge
owners to remedymatters rather than risk being compelled to take action by a council.
Perhaps there was concern that the issue of a notice might be perceived as a victory of
sorts by the neighbour with whom they were in dispute. It remains to be seen whether
the wealth of publicity generated by the passing of the Scottish Act has the effect of
similarly moderating behaviour north of the border. However, the introduction of a
mechanism of both resolution and enforcement for those who have quite literally
lived in the shadow of blight caused by a towering hedge, is a welcome development
within neighbour law.
E A Comerford
University of Dundee
5 Scothedge, Response to Consultation High Hedges and other Nuisance Vegetation (2009), 4, available
at http://www.scothedge.colwat.com/files/SCOTHEDGE%20RESPONSE%20TO%20CONSULTANCY
(Final3).pdf.
